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Case No. 20140602-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff! Appellee, 
V. 
COOPER JOHN ANTHONY VAN HUIZEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from the juvenile court's decision under the Serious 
Youth Offender Act (SYOA) to bind him over to district court on charges of 
aggravated robbery, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302, and aggravated burglary, Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-203, first degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction under 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(c) (West Supp. 2014). 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant, who was 16 years old, knowingly supplied guns for a home-
invasion robbery to steal drugs, and then participated in that robbery. After 
analyzing the SYOA factors, the juvenile court bound him over for trial in 
district court because of his age and the seriousness of his crimes. Defendant 
"'° challenges that ruling on several grounds. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. For the first time on appeal, Defendant argues that the 2013 SYOA 
amendments made evidence about his rehabilitative potential and his mental 
condition relevant considerations for the juvenile court. 
Was Defendant's counsel ineffective for not arguing, or did the juvenile 
court plainly err by not interpreting, the 2013 SYOA amendments as Defendant 
now does? 
Standard of Review. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for the 
first time on appeal are reviewed for correctness. State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 
160, 134, 789 Utah Adv. Rep. 21. Plain error requires a showing of obvious, 
prejudicial error. Id. 128. 
2. Did the juvenile court clearly error in making its findings under the 
SYOA factors, or did it abuse its discretion in concluding that Defendant had 
not carried his burden to show that it should retain his case? 
Standard of Review. Factual findings under the SYOA factors are reviewed 
for clear error. In re M.E.P., 2005 UT App 227, 'lf15, 114 P.3d 596. Because the 
juvenile court's ultimate decision involved a "best interests" determination 
based on a weighing of factors, it should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
See Doyle v. Doyle, 2011 UT 42, ,I40, 258 P.3d 553 (applying abuse of discretion 
standard in child custody "best interests" determinations). 
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3. Was Defendant's trial counsel ineffective in arguing the evidence 
before the juvenile court and in agreeing to allow the hearing to be held jointly 
with a codefendant? 
Standard of Review. See issue 1. 
4. Was the juvenile court judge required to recuse herself sua sponte 
because she was a former prosecutor and was married to the chief criminal 
deputy in the prosecutor's office? 
Standard of Review. See issue 1. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains: 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-701 (West Supp. 2013) (automatic waiver); 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702 (West Supp. 2013) (SYOA); 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-703 (West Supp. 2013) (certification); 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-2-222 (West 2009) (disqualification); 
Utah R. Juv. P. 22 (preliminary hearing in SYOA cases); 
Utah R. Juv. P. 23A (SYOA hearings); 
Utah R. Jud. Conduct 2.11 (disqualification). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 
Defendant supplies guns for, and participates in, a home-invasion robbery 
Defendant and Joshua Dutson were good friends. R161,293-94. Dutson 
introduced Defendant to Wesley Brown, Dexter Skinner, and Tomek Perkins. 
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R263,266,282-88,363. Brown, Skinner, and Perkins were all 18 years old; Dutson 
was 17; Defendant was 16. R160-63,165,363. 
The group had run out of marijuana and planned to get more by robbing 
Christian Davidson. R237,282-88. Wesley Brown had previously lived with 
Davidson and knew that he would have marijuana. R247-48,282-83. Brown 
planned the robbery and the others, including Defendant, agreed to the plan. 
R282-83 ,288,306-07. 
The group first drove to Defendant's house and Defendant took two of 
his father's guns. R237,295. The group then drove to Davidson's home. 
R237,283. 
Davidson was expecting a visit from friends when he heard a "loud 
knock." R246-47. 1 He opened the door and found a stranger holding "a large 
revolver." R247-49,251. Davidson tried to close the door, but the intruder put 
his foot in the door and said, "Open the door, I'm going to pop (inaudible)." 
R247,260. The intruder added, '"We're coming in,"' and commanded Davidson 
to go downstairs. R247. The arn1ed inh·uder was Dexter Skinner. R251. 
Wesley Brown, Joshua Dutson, and Defendant followed Skinner into 
1 An unbound copy of the juvenile court preliminary hearing h·anscript is 
R240-401. The record contains a separate bound copy, but that copy did not 
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Davidson's home while Tomek Perkins waited outside in a car. R276,278. The 
intruders were armed with the two handguns Defendant had supplied and an 
air-soft gun that looked like a real handgun. R283-84,302-03. 
One of the intruders asked who else was home. R248. Davidson replied 
that his mother was, but did not mention his friend Ryan Golding who was also 
there. R248,264. Hearing a noise in the laundry room, Skinner tucked his pistol 
into the waistband of his pants. R248,251. But when Golding emerged from the 
laundry room, Skinner lifted his shirt to show him the butt of the gun. 
R248,251-52. Apparently confused, Golding remarked that the gun was "cool," 
and reached to touch it, but Davidson warned his friend not to. R248,251-52. 
Skinner then pulled the gun out of his waistband, pointed it at the ground, and 
remarked, "Yeah, man, his body is on this." R252. 
Skinner then II quickly" pointed the gun at Davidson's face and 
demanded that Davidson II give him everything." R248,252. Shocked, Davidson 
"laughed" and said, "'Seriously, over pot?"' R252. Brown and a third intruder 
then drew their guns. R252-53,310. 
The evidence of who held the third gun was conflicting. Davidson 
testified that Defendant did. R253. And Dutson wrote in his initial police 
statement that Defendant had brandished a gun. R286-87. But in his police 
interview, Dutson said that he, Brown, and Skinner were the only ones who 
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held guns and that Defendant instead held a switchblade knife. R284,287. 
Defendant denied holding a gun or knife during the robbery. R299. 
With their guns drawn, the intruders told Davidson to "get everything" 
he had and "lay on the floor." R254. When Davidson said he only had the 
"tiny" bag of "weed" on the table, Skinner remarked that he had seen Davidson 
slip a larger bag of marijuana into his pocket. R254. Davidson surrendered the 
larger bag. R254. 
Skinner then directed someone to take Davidson's wallet and phone. 
R254. Davidson testified that he did not see who took them. R254-55. During 
an earlier photo lineup, however, Davidson identified Defendant as the person 
who took them. R311-12. 
Ryan Golding, Davidson's friend, told police that the intruders ordered 
him and Davidson to the ground and stole their phones and money. R264-65. 
Golding also reported that the intruders threatened to kill him and Davidson if 
they tried to interfere or report the crimes. R265. 
One of the intruders told Davidson to stay on the floor and Brown, who 
had previously lived with Davidson, said he was going to II pay" Davidson's 
mother II a visit." R255. The others "rushed" up the stairs and out of the house. 
R255. Meanwhile, Brown pointed his gun at Davidson, hesitated, and 
mentioned an earlier altercation between the two when they had briefly lived 
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together. R255. Davidson feared for his life. R255. Luckily, however, Brown 
ultimately fled. R255. After the robbery, the group shared the stolen 
marijuana. R288. 
Davidson's mother reported the crimes. R263-64. When police initially 
approached Davidson and Golding, Golding fled but was quickly apprehended 
and told police what happened. R264. 
Defendant ad1nitted to police that he supplied the two real guns used in 
the robbery. R295-96. He took them from his father's gun safe. R296. 
Defendant also admitted that he entered Davidson's home with the rest of the 
intruders. R294-95. 
Defendant's text messages discussing armed robbery 
Police searched Defendant's cellphone but could not retrieve any text 
messages from it. R267,305. A search of Dutson's cellphone, however, revealed 
his text-message conversations with both Defendant and Skinner. R267-68; 
State's Exhibit #1 (SEl) (Addendmn G is the texts verbatim).2 
The evening before the robbery, Dutson asked Defendant in a text if he 
wanted to participate in a robbery and promised Defendant "a cut of it." 
R268;SE1. Defendant replied "for sure," and said he had to get his gun back 
from "anddrew." R268;SE1. Dutson then said he "was kidding," but quickly 
2 State's Exhibit 1 is in the juvenile court's pleadings files. 
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retracted that statement and texted that he was not kidding. R268;SE1. When 
Defendant replied that he was confused, Dutson explained that Defendant 
could participate in the robbery as long as he kept it a secret: "you can be apart 
[sic] of it but you gotta keep it on the down low" and II h 4 ust no nigga." R268-
69;SE1. 
When Defendant then asked about leaving "early," Dutson replied, 
"Yeah ... so we can get the lick." R269-70;SE1. "Lick" is a slang term for a 
robbery or a robbery victim. R270,272. Thus, to "hit up a lick is to ... rob 
somebody." R272,305-06. 
Dutson had a simultaneous text conversation with Skinner discussing the 
upcoming robbery. R269-70;SE1. Skinner told Dutson "[t]omorrow we grab 
them straps and hit up niggas." R269;SE1. "Strap" is a slang term for a gun. 
See www.urbandictionary.com/ define.php?term=strap; see also Br.Aplt. 7 
(recognizing that the "straps" Skinner referred to II were apparently 
[Defendant's] father's guns"). 
The day after the robbery, Dutson asked Defendant in a text if he wanted 
to participate in another robbery ("hit up a lick"). R271;SE1. Defendant replied 
"Maybe." R271;SE1. Dutson initially said the robbery would involve "[t]he 
little white boys we hit up," but followed up with "Hahah." R271;SE1. When 
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Defendant asked about "hitting them again" Dutson responded, "Jk Haha 
Imhigh." R272;SE1. "Jk" is an abbreviation for "just kidding." R272. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
The State charged Defendant under the SYOA in the juvenile court with 
two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated burglary, all 
first degree felonies. JRl-3.3 The juvenile court found that the State had 
established probable cause that Defendant had committed those crimes and that 
Defendant had not carried his burden to show that the juvenile court should 
retain his case. JR.28-31. It therefore bound him over to district court. JR31. 
Defendant did not appeal that final order. 
Defendant pled guilty in district court to two reduced counts of robbery, 
second degree felonies. R16-21. The court sentenced him to 1-15 years in 
prison. R52-53. 
Defendant obtained new counsel and moved to quash the juvenile court's 
bindover order and to reinstate his right to appeal that order. R93-101,414-34. 
The district court denied the motion to quash because it lacked jurisdiction to 
consider it. R587-89 (Addendun1 Fis a copy of the ruling). The district court 
granted Defendant's motion to reinstate his right to appeal the bindover order, 
however, after Defendant alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for not 
3 The State cites the juvenile court record as "JR" and the district court 
record as "R." 
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notifying him of his right to appeal the order or the deadline for doing so, and 
after the State stipulated to Defendant's motion. R589-91,612 (Add. F). 
Defendant timely appeals. R599. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Defendant argues that the 2013 SYOA amendments made his mental 
condition and his amenability to rehabilitation using juvenile court resources 
relevant to the juvenile court's bindover decision. He argues that his counsel 
was ineffective for not arguing these factors and presenting evidence to support 
them, and that the juvenile court plainly erred for not sua sponte considering 
these factors and requiring a psychological evaluation of Defendant. 
Defendant has not shown that his trial counsel or the juvenile court erred, 
because he misinterprets 2013 SYOA amendments. Those amendments did not 
make a defendant's rehabilitative potential or mental condition relevant, 
because the amendments did not include those considerations in the exclusive 
list of factors that a juvenile court may consider in making a SYOA 
determination. By including those factors in the related certification statute, but 
excluding them from the SYOA, the legislature made it clear that those factors 
were not relevant to SYOA detern1inations. The fact that 2015 amend1nents 
added rehabilitative potential to the SYOA factors further supports the 
conclusion that the 2013 amendments did not include that consideration. 
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But even if rehabilitative potential and mental condition were arguably 
relevant considerations under the 2013 SYOA amendments, that fact would not 
have been so obvious that trial counsel was ineffective, or the trial court plainly 
erred, for not recognizing it. 
In any event, Defendant cannot show the prejudice required for either 
claim. The juvenile court considered his rehabilitative potential and found it 
unpersuasive. And Defendant's newly proffered psychological evaluation 
would not have likely convinced the juvenile court to retain his case, because 
the evaluation did not undermine the findings that Defendant facilitated violent 
crimes by providing guns to his friends and then participated in those crimes. 
Those findings were the primary reasons for the juvenile court's decision. 
II. Defendant argues that the juvenile court misapplied the SYOA to the 
facts and erroneously concluded that he had not carried his heavy burden to 
show that it should retain his case. But Defendant does not even allege, let 
alone demonsh·ate, that any of the juvenile court's factual findings were clearly 
erroneous. Those findings established that he knowingly facilitated violent 
crhnes by providing guns to his friends and participated in those crimes. 
Given those findings, Defendant has not shown that the juvenile court 
abused its discretion in concluding that he did not prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that it should retain his case. This Court should review the 
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juvenile court's order only for abuse of discretion because that order required a 
"best interests" determination based on a weighing of various factors by a court 
with specialized experience in dealing with juveniles. 
III. Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in arguing the 
various pieces of evidence in the juvenile court and for allowing Defendant's 
hearing to proceed jointly with a codefendant's hearing. The fact that trial 
counsel did not argue the evidence as Defendant's appellate counsel would 
have does not show that trial counsel was deficient. The record also discloses a 
reasonable tactical basis for holding a joint hearing where the juvenile court was 
required to compare Defendant's culpability with that of his codefendant, and 
the evidence showed that Defendant was less involved at the crime scene. 
Regardless, Defendant has not shown prejudice where none of his new 
arguments would have undermined his admissions that he facilitated violent 
crimes by providing guns and participated in those crimes, and none of the 
allegedly inadmissible evidence that he now identifies affected the juvenile 
court's decision. 
IV. Defendant argues that the juvenile court plainly erred by not sua 
sponte recusing herself where (1) she was married to a supervising prosecutor 
in the office prosecuting Defendant and (2) the judge was a former prosecutor. 
But no controlling authority plainly established that the judge's marriage to a 
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prosecutor who was not involved in the case required recusal. Controlling 
authority did establish, however, that the judge's former employment as a 
prosecutor did not require recusal. Moreover, Defendant has not alleged, let 
alone demonstrated, that the judge was actually biased. Thus, Defendant has 




DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL WAS 
INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT ARGUING, OR THAT THE JUVENILE COURT 
PLAINLY ERRED BY NOT SUA SPONTE ADOPTING, HIS INCORRECT 
INTERPRETATION OF THE 2013 SYOA AMENDMENTS 
In his Point I(A)-(C), Defendant argues that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for not: (1) arguing that the 2013 SYOA amendments required the 
juvenile court to consider his potential for rehabilitation in the juvenile system, 
and (2) providing the court with a psychological evaluation of Defendant, 
expert testimony from the evaluator, and psychological studies and caselaw 
generally addressing juvenile psychological development. Br.Aplt. 15-24. In 
his Point II, Defendant argues that the juvenile court plainly erred by not 
interpreting the 2013 SYOA an1endn1ents to require consideration of 
Defendant's rehabilitative potential and mental condition. Br.Aplt. 31-44. 
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Defendant has not shown that his counsel was ineffective, or that the 
juvenile court plainly erred, because he is the one who misinterprets the 2013 
SYOA amendments. The amendments did not 1nake a defendant's 
rehabilitative potential or mental condition relevant factors. 
A. While the legislature has determined that most juvenile 
offenders should be adjudicated in juvenile court, it has created a 
statutory presumption in favor of trying the oldest juveniles who 
commit the most serious crimes in adult court. 
The people of Utah, through their elected representatives, have 
determined that while most juvenile offenders should be adjudicated in the 
juvenile court, the adult system is usually better equipped to address older 
juveniles who commit the most serious crimes. The statutory scheme 
nevertheless grants juvenile courts discretion to retain some older juveniles 
who commit serious crimes. This discretion increases as the juvenile's age and 
seriousness of his crime decreases. 
The legislature has given juvenile courts II exclusive original jurisdiction 
1n proceedings concerning" most minors and those under 21 who have 
11 
violated any law or ordinance before becoming 18 years of age." Utah Code 
Ann. §78A-6-103(1)(a) (West Supp. 2013). The chief purpose of Utah's juvenile 
justice systen1 is to ensure II public safety and individual accountability" by 
imposing II appropriate sanctions" on juvenile offenders. Utah Code Ann. §78A-
6-102(5)(a) (West 2009). 
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Because juveniles generally commit less serious cnmes and are less 
responsible than adults, the legislature has equipped juvenile courts to provide 
a broad array of services, but a limited array of criminal-like sanctions. See State 
v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, if 16, 63 P.3d 667 (recognizing that juvenile offenders 
11 are still in their formative years"); Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-117 (West Supp. 
2013) (listing juvenile court services and sanctions). Juvenile court sanctions 
focus primarily II on the education, rehabilitation, and treatment of minors." 
Schofield, 2002 UT 132, if 16. Thus, while a juvenile court can adjudicate an 
offender II delinquent," it cannot impose a criminal conviction that will be 
reflected in a permanent criminal record. See Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-116(1) to 
(3) (West Supp. 2014); Schofield, 2002 UT 132, ,I16. And while a juvenile court 
can detain a youth offender if the need for public safety and individual 
accountability warrants it, it can do so only until the offender turns 21. Utah 
Code Ann. §§62A-7-404(1) (West 2012); 78A-6-117(d); 78A-6-120. 
Given a juvenile court's limited jurisdiction and array of sanctions, the 
juvenile syste1n is ill-equipped to deal with older offenders who commit the 
most serious crimes. The legislature therefore enacted three interrelated 
statutes to address these offenders: sections 701, 702, and 703 of the Juvenile 
Court Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§78A-6-701 to -703 (West Supp. 2013). 
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The first statute-previously called the "direct-file" statute but more 
correctly termed the "automatic waiver" statute- applies to 16- or 17-year-olds 
who commit murder or aggravated murder. See Utah Code Am1. §78A-6-701 
(West Supp. 2013); State v. Angilau, 2011 UT 3, iJl n.1, 245 P.3d 745. This statute 
automatically waives juvenile court jurisdiction over these offenders and vests 
jurisdiction exclusively in the district court. See id. 
The second statute, the SYOA, applies to 16- or 17-year-olds who commit 
one of nine "inherently violent and aggressive offenses," such as aggravated 
robbery or burglary. See Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702 (West Supp. 2013); 
Housekeeper v. State, 2008 UT 78, iJ7, 197 P.3d 636 (quotation and citation 
omitted). The SYOA creates "a strong presumption" that such offenders will be 
tried in the district court. See Housekeeper, 2008 UT 78, iJ7 (quotation and 
citation omitted). 
Under the SYOA, a prosecutor files a criminal information in juvenile 
court charging an enumerated offense. Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702(1) (West 
Supp. 2013). The prosecutor then has the burden to show probable cause that 
the defendant com1nitted that offense. Id. §78A-6-702(3)(a). If the prosecutor 
carries that burden, the juvenile court "shall order that the defendant be bound 
over and held to answer in the district court in the same manner as an adult," 
unless the offender can successfully carry a "heavy burden" to show that the 
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juvenile court should retain him. Id. §78A-6-702(3)(b); In re F.L.R., 2006 UT App 
294, ,I4, 141 P.3d 601. 
When the juvenile court heard Defendant's case in 2013, the SYOA 
allowed the juvenile court to retain Defendant's case only if he showed by 
11 clear and convincing evidence" that II it would be contrary to the best interest 
of the minor and to the public" to bind him over to the district court. Id. §78A-
6-702(3)(b) & (d). In evaluating whether Defendant had made that showing, the 
SYOA limited the juvenile court to considering II only the following" factors: 
(i) whether the minor has been previously adjudicated delinquent 
for an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which 
would be a felony if committed by an ad ult; 
(ii) if the offense was committed with one or more other persons, 
whether the minor appears to have a greater or lesser degree of 
culpability than the codefendants; 
(iii) the extent to which the minor's role in the offense was 
committed in a violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner; 
(iv) the number and nature of the minor's prior adjudications in 
the juvenile court; and 
(v) whether public safety is better served by adjudicating the 
minor in the juvenile court or in the district court. 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702(3)(c). 
The third statute, known as the certification statute, applies to youth 
offenders under 16 who commit serious crimes. See Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-
703 (West Supp. 2013). This statute allows a prosecutor to file a criminal 
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information charging a minor 14 or older with any crime that would be a felony 
if committed by an adult, and ask that the juvenile court certify the offender to 
district court. Id. §§78A-6-602(3); 78A-6-703(1). The prosecutor then has the 
burden of showing both: (1) probable cause that the juvenile committed the 
charged offense; and (2) "by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would be 
contrary to the best interests of the minor or of the public for the juvenile court 
to retain jurisdiction." Id. §78A-6-703(2). 
In making this second determination, the certification statute requires a 
juvenile court to consider ten factors, and allows the court to base its finding on 
any one or more of those factors. Id. §78A-6-703(3). The statute also allows the 
court to consider "[w ]ritten reports and other materials relating to the minor's 
mental, physical, educational, and social history." Id. §78A-6-703(5)(a). 
Thus, the SYOA creates a presumption in favor of district court and limits 
the factors that a juvenile court n1ay consider in deciding whether the offender 
has shown that retention is appropriate. The certification statute, which deals 
with younger offenders, creates a presumption in favor of juvenile court and 
enlarges the factors and evidence that a court may consider in deciding whether 
the prosecution has shown that certification is appropriate. 
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B. The juvenile court bound Defendant over to district court 
because he knowingly supplied guns for a home-invasion 
robbery, participated in that robbery, and was 16 years old. 
The juvenile court here found that Defendant had not rebutted the 
SYOA' s presumption that he should be tried in district court. The court first 
found probable cause that Defendant committed two counts of aggravated 
robbery and one count of aggravated burglary. JR28 (Addendum D is the 
co\].rt' s written order and Addendum E is the court's oral ruling). Defendant 
does not challenge those findings. 
The juvenile court then considered whether Defendant had shown "by 
clear and convincing evidence that it would be contrary to the best interest of 
the minor and the best interests of the public to bind the defendant over to the 
jurisdiction of the district court," based on the five statutory factors detailed 
above. See Utah Code Ann. §§78A-6-702(3)(c), (d) & (e); JR28-31. After 
analyzing each factor, the court concluded that he had not. JR.31. 
As to the first factor-whether Defendant had any prior dangerous-
weapon offenses in juvenile court-the prosecutor stipulated, and the juvenile 
court found, that Defendant had "no prior record in juvenile court." JR28;R320-
21,362,371. 
The court then compared Defendant's culpability to that of his 
codefendants and found" that his culpability was significant." JR29. The court 
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initially found that Defendant's "involvement was less at the scene of the crime 
than others," because there was insufficient evidence to show "that he 
brandished a gun or switchblade knife." JR29. 
The court nevertheless found Defendant's relative culpability 
"significant" because he "provided the guns" used in the crimes and did so 
"knowing they would be used in the burglary and robberies." JR29. The court 
noted that Defendant's "assistance in the robbery ensured that the other 
codefendant's would have guns to use when breaking into the home and 
robbing the persons therein." JR29. The court also found that Defendant was 
"present and assisted in the forced entrance into the home." JR29. 
Under the third factor, the court found that Defendant's "role 1n the 
offense was committed in a violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner," 
primarily because he knowingly supplied the guns. JR29. The court found that 
the crimes were planned "over a period of time" and were not "a spur of the 
moment decision." JR29-30. The court also found that Defendant and his 
cohorts "forced their way at gun point into one of the most protected and 
sacred areas in our society, the home." JR29. The court further found that 
although Defendant did not wield a weapon, his "presence in the home, by 
itself, was a threat to the victims and to others who were in or could have come 
into the home." JR30. 
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Regarding the fourth factor-prior adjudications in juvenile court- the 
court restated that this was Defendant's first offense. JR30. 
Finally, regarding the fifth factor, the court found several reasons that 
public safety would be best served by sending Defendant to district court: 
• Defendant was already 16 and the court would have jurisdiction over 
him only until he reached 21, while the district court's jurisdiction was 
unlimited; 
• the offenses were "among the most serious in our community" because 
they involved "drugs, violence, firearms, and forcing entry into a home to 
commit robberies"; 
• the crimes involved "acts of aggression" in a home and therefore 
presented a significant "likelihood of harm to others," including law 
enforcement and other members of the public; 
• "[p ]ublic safety requires a strong response and longer correctional period 
than is available in the juvenile court" given the seriousness of the crimes; 
and 
e a strong response was necessary because, although Defendant "provided 
evidence of a loving family and good home," Defendant nevertheless 
"chose to engage in violent and irresponsible acts that put the safety of 
members of the public at grave risk." 
JR30. 
Regarding the ultimate inquiry, the juvenile court found that although 
Defendant had shown that retention was in his best interest, he had not shown 
by clear and convincing evidence that retention was also in the public's best 
interest. JR31. Regarding Defendant's best interests, the court recognized that 
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"[t]here are more rehabilitative services ... available in the juvenile system than 
in the adult system." R374-75. But because Defendant had not shown that 
retention was in the public's best interest, the court bound Defendant over to 
the district court. JR31. 
C. The 2013 SYOA amendments did not make a defendant's 
rehabilitative potential or mental condition relevant 
considerations. 
Defendant argues that the 2013 amendments allowed juvenile courts to 
consider a youth offender's potential for rehabilitation using juvenile court 
resources, and his individual mental condition. Br.Aplt.16-24, 38-41. Relying 
entirely on the legislative history of the 2013 amendments, rather than on the 
actual statutory language, Defendant argues that the amendments vvere 
intended to "reduce the number of juveniles" transferred to the adult system 
"without first exhausting the resources of the juvenile system." Br.Aplt.17-19. 
Defendant also argues that the amendments increased the scope of 
relevant evidence at a serious youth offender preliminary hearing to include 
information about the juvenile's mental condition, his amenability to 
rehabilitation in the juvenile system, and evidence that juveni~es who are 
sentenced in the adult system generally have a higher recidivism rate. Br.Aplt. 
16-24. He contends that evidence about his "stage of development [and] 
intellectual and emotional functioning" in the form of a psychological 
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evaluation "was key to the court's accurate assessment of the retention factors." 
Br.Aplt. 20, 24. He proffers a psychological evaluation that his appellate 
counsel obtained after Defendant pled guilty and was sentenced. R406. 
Defendant reasons that had the juvenile court understood the statute in this 
light and received evidence about his rehabilitative potential and mental 
condition in the form of a psychological evaluation, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the juvenile court would have struck the balance in favor of 
retaining his case. Br.Aplt. 16-24, 31-43. 
The 2013 SYOA amendments did give juvenile courts greater discretion 
in determining whether to retain charged offenders. But the amendments did 
not make rehabilitative potential or a defendant's mental condition relevant 
considerations. 
Before 2013, the SYOA gave juvenile courts only limited discretion to 
retain offenders because it included only three retention factors and made those 
factors determinative, rather than considerations in a larger "best interests" 
determination. If the prosecution established probable cause that the defendant 
had committed an enun1erated crin1e, then the Act required the court to bind 
the defendant over to the district court unless the defendant proved the three 
retention factors by clear and convincing evidence. Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-
107(3) (West Supp. 2012). These three factors are essentially the first three 
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factors in the amended statute. The Defendant had to show that: (1) he had no 
prior adjudications for a dangerous-weapon offense that would have been a 
felony if committed by an adult; (2) he had a lesser degree of culpability if the 
offense was committed with others; and (3) his role in the offense was not 
violent, aggressive, or premeditated. See Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702(3)(c) 
(West Supp. 2012). 
The 2013 amendments retained much of the prior statute. As explained, a 
juvenile court must still bind a defendant over to district court upon a finding 
of probable cause, absent a showing that retention is appropriate. See Utah 
Code Ann. §78A-6-702(3)(b) (Addendum Bis the enrolled copy of H.B. 105, the 
2013 amendments). The amendments also leave the burden on the defendant to 
satisfy the retention standard "by clear and convincing evidence." See id. 
§§78A-6-702(3)(d) & (e). ~ 
But two features of the 2013 amendments granted juvenile courts greater 
discretion to retain serious youth offenders. First, the amendments allowed the 
juvenile court to consider two more factors: 
(iv) the number and nature of the minor's prior adjudications in 
the juvenile court; and 
(v) whether public safety is better served by adjudicating the 
minor in the juvenile court or in the district court. 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702(3)(c)(iv) & (v). 
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Second, and most significantly, the amendments changed the test for 
determining whether retention was appropriate. Rather than making that test 
dependent on the offender's ability to prove each of the factors, the 
amendments designated those factors as the exclusive components of a 
determination based on a weighing of the "best interests" of the offender and 
the public. See id. §78A-6-702(3). 
But the plain language of the 2013 amendments shows that they did not 
modify the SYOA to the extent that Defendant now claims. Although the 
legislature increased a juvenile court's discretion by adding the "best interest" 
determination, the legislature limited that discretion to considering" only" the 
five factors in subsection (c) in making that determination. Id. §78A-6-702(3)(c). 
Amended subsection ( d) reiterated that the "best interest" determination must 
be made "in light of the [five] considerations listed in Subsection (3)(c)." Id. 
§78A-6-702(3) ( d). 
None of the five factors that a juvenile court must consider include a 
youth offender's mental condition or amenability to rehabilitation in the 
juvenile syste1n. Id. §78A-6-702(c). Nor do those factors include evidence that 
1ninors generally lack emotional n1aturity or evidence of the recidivism rates for 
minors incarcerated in the adult system. Id. Thus, the plain language of the 
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statute did not allow the juvenile court to consider the additional factors and 
evidence that Defendant now proffers. 
The certification statute further demonstrates that the legislature did not 
intend the juvenile court to consider Defendant's potential for rehabilitation or 
mental condition in making a determination under the SYOA. When 
construing the SYOA, this Court must "interpret its provisions in harmony with 
other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters," like the certification 
statute. See State in Interest of A. T., 2015 UT 41, if 16, 783 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 
(quotation and citation omitted). 
As mentioned, the certification statute lists ten factors that a juvenile 
court must consider in deciding whether to certify and offender to district court. 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-703(3). Those factors include: 
"(e) the maturity of the minor as determined by consideration of 
the minor's home, environment, emotional attitude, and 
pattern of living;" and 
"(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use of facilities 
available to the juvenile court." 
Utah Code Ann. §§78A-6-703(3)(e) & (g). The certification statute also allows a 
juvenile court to consider [w]ritten reports and other materials relating to the 
minor's mental, physical, educational, and social history." Id. §78A-6-703(5)(a). 
By including these factors and evidence supporting them in the certification 
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statute, but omitting them from the SYOA, the legislature underscored its intent 
that juvenile courts not consider these factors and evidence under the SYOA. 
This Court confirmed this conclusion in In re A.B., 936 P.2d 1091, 1097-98 
(Utah App. 1997). Like Defendant here, A.B. argued that the legislative history 
of the SYOA indicated "that the Legislature intended to apply adult sanctions 
only to juvenile offenders unamenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system." 
Id. at 1096. This Court disagreed however, noting that the plain language of the 
SYOA did not include consideration of an offender's potential for rehabilitation, 
while the related certification statute did. Id. at 1097-98. This Court therefore 
explained that "the Utah Legislature clearly knew how to make rehabilitation a 
consideration in determining whether to waive jurisdiction over a youth 
offender; had the Legislature intended it to be considered in the serious youth 
offender statute, the Legislature would have so stated." Id. at 1098. The court 
further explained that the "isolated remarks" of a few legislators could not 
"trump the plain language and context of the statute," which did not include 
consideration of an offenders rehabilitative potential. Id. 
Like A.B., Defendant also relies on statements from the bill's sponsors to 
support his interpretation of the 2013 amendments. Br.Aplt. 17-18. Some of 
those remarks do mention the rehabilitative services available in juvenile court. 
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But as in A.B., those remarks cannot "trump the plain language and context of 
the statute." 936 P.2d at 1098. 
Defendant contends that evidence about his rehabilitative potential and 
mental condition is relevant to considerations of public safety, one of the listed 
factors. Br.Aplt. 17-19. He argues that "public safety interests coincide with the 
juvenile's interests in retaining juveniles in the juvenile courts" because youth 
offenders who stay in the juvenile system are more likely to be rehabilitated, 
while those treated as adults are more likely to reoffend. Br.Aplt. 18. 
Defendant may well be correct that the juvenile system is generally more 
effective in rehabilitating most youth offenders than the adult system. And he 
may also be correct that, generally speaking, it would be good policy to 
consider a youthful offender's rehabilitative potential. But that does not mean 
that the legislature intended juvenile courts to consider a juvenile's likelihood 
of rehabilitation and mental condition as factors under the 2013 SYOA. Rather, 
the statutory language evidences a reasonable policy decision that when the 
oldest 1ninors commit the most serious crimes, public safety is best served by 
e1nphasizing accountability and punishment over rehabilitation. Indeed, the 
SYOA applies only to 16-or 17-year-olds who commit one of nine "inherently 
violent and aggressive offenses." Housekeeper, 2008 UT 78, ,I7. 
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This Court has repeatedly recognized the reasonableness of this policy 
decision. See In re A.B., 936 P.2d at 1097-99; In re M.E.P., 2005 UT App 227, ,I14 
n.4, 114 P.3d 596. In M.E.P., this Court acknowledged that while the SYOA's 
presumption in favor of the adult system "may, at times, thrust juveniles who 
would benefit from the rehabilitative nature of the juvenile system into the 
world of adult criminal sanctions, it implements the legislative goals of 
emphasizing public safety, accountability, and punishment for certain violent 
juvenile offenders, with a lesser goal of rehabilitation." 2005 UT App 227, if14 
n.4. 
Defendant argues that the 2013 amendments undermine A.B. Br.Aplt. 18. 
But as explained, the 2013 amendments did not add a juvenile's rehabilitative 
potential or mental condition to the list of factors in the SYOA. Rather, those 
amendments expressly state that a SYOA determination is to be based "only" 
on the listed factors. See Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702(3)(c). A.B. therefore still 
controls. 
Finally, the 2015 amendments to the SYOA settle any doubt about the 
relevancy of an offender's rehabilitative potential and mental condition. 
Effective May 2015, the legislature ainended the SYOA' s fifth factor to include 
an offender's rehabilitative potential as a consideration. As amended, the 
statute now reads that a juvenile court "shall consider only the following: 
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(v) whether public safety and the interests of the minor are better 
served by adjudicating the minor in the juvenile court or in the 
district court, including whether the resources of the adult system or 
juvenile system are m.ore likely to assist in rehabilitating the minor and 
reducing the threat which the minor presents to the public. 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702(3)(c)(v) (West Supp. 2015) (emphasis added) 
(Addendum C is an enrolled copy of S.B. 167, the 2015 amendments). Thus, the 
legislature did not include a juvenile's rehabilitative potential as a relevant 
consideration under the SYOA until 2015. 
Whether previous versions of the SYOA were well-crafted or furthered 
good policy is not at issue. Rather, the issue is the scope of what the SYOA 
allowed the juvenile court to consider at Defendant's hearing. As the plain 
language of the then-effective SYOA, the language of the certification statute, 
the holding in A.B., and the 2015 SYOA amendments all demonstrate, the SYOA 
did not allow the juvenile court to consider Defendant's mental condition or his 
amenability to rehabilitation in the juvenile system. See Utah Code Ann. §78A-
6-702(3)(c). 
D. Because Defendant misinterprets the SYOA, he has not shown 
that his trial counsel was ineffective, or that the juvenile court 
plainly erred, in interpreting the statute. 
As mentioned, Defendant asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
not (1) asking the juvenile court to consider his rehabilitative potential using 
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juvenile court services, and (2) presenting evidence of his rehabilitative 
potential in the form of a psychological evaluation and research and caselaw on 
the mental condition of juveniles generally. Br.Aplt. 20-24. Defendant also 
argues that the juvenile court plainly erred by not sua sponte considering his 
rehabilitative potential, the "reformative benefits available to [him] in the 
juvenile court," and requiring "a professional evaluation" of his mental 
condition. Br.Aplt. 38-42. Defendant has not shown, however, that his counsel 
was ineffective or that the juvenile court plainly erred, because his arguments 
are all based on his misinterpretation of the 2013 SYOA amendments. 
To prove that his counsel was ineffective, Defendant must show that his 
counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance 
prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 691-94 (1984). 
Counsel performs deficiently only when his actions "f[a]ll below an objective 
standard of reasonableness" as measured by the "prevailing professional 
norms." Id. 688; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). Prejudice results 
only when there is "' a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."' 
Id. at 694. 
To prove that the juvenile court plainly erred, Defendant must show that 
the court committed an error that was both obvious and prejudicial. State v. 
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Isom, 2015 UT App 160, if 28, 789 Utah Adv. Rep. 21. An error is obvious if it 
11 contravenes settled appellate law or the plain language of the relevant 
statute." Id. (quotations and citations omitted). "An error is prejudicial if 
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome 
for the appellant." Id. ( quotation and citation omitted). 
As explained, the 2013 amendments did not allow the juvenile court to 
consider Defendant's rehabilitative potential or mental condition. Because none 
of this evidence was relevant under the statute, Defendant cannot show that his 
counsel acted unreasonably when he did not present it. Nor can Defendant 
show that the trial court plainly erred by not considering it. 
But even if this evidence were arguably relevant under the 2013 
amendments, Defendant still could not show that his counsel performed 
deficiently. To be objectively unreasonable, 11 trial counsel's error must be so 
egregious that no reasonably competent attorney would have acted similarly." 
Harvey v. Warden, Union Corr. Inst., 629 F.3d 1228, 1239 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing 
Wood v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1281, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008)); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 
U.S. 374, 389 (2005) (counsel's perforn1ance was objectively umeasonable 
because "[n]o reasonable lawyer" would have acted as counsel did); State v. 
Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, if 53, 321 P.3d 1136 (forgoing an objection would be 
objectively umeasonable only where "no reasonable defense lawyer" would do 
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so); State v. Curtis, 2013 UT App 287, 135, 317 P.3d 968 (no showing of deficient 
performance where defendant failed to show that evidence was so compelling 
"that no reasonable attorney would have failed to introduce it"). 
Defendant has not shown that all reasonable attorneys would have 
interpreted the 2013 SYOA amendments as making a juvenile's rehabilitative 
potential and mental condition relevant. As explained, controlling caselaw 
established that by excluding rehabilitative potential from an earlier version of 
the SYOA, but including it in the certification statute, the legislature clearly 
signaled its intent to exclude this consideration from SYOA determinations. See 
In re A.B., 936 P.2d at 1097-98. The 2013 amendments did not explicitly add 
rehabilitative potential to the exclusive list of SYOA factors. Nor did any 
caselaw establish that the amendments made rehabilitative potential relevant. 
Thus, even if the amendments arguably made rehabilitative potential relevant, 
that result was not so obvious that Defendant's trial counsel was objectively 
unreasonable for not recognizing it. 
For these same reasons, Defendant cannot show that the juvenile court 
plainly erred. Neither the plain language of the amendments, nor any 
controlling caselaw, established that rehabilitative potential and mental 
condition were relevant factors. Thus, any error in interpreting the 
amendments not to include these considerations could not have been obvious. 
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See Isom, 2015 UT App 160, ,I28 (" obvious" error contravenes settled appellate 
law or plain statutory language). 
E. Defendant has not shown prejudice, because the juvenile court 
considered his rehabilitative potential, and a psychological 
evaluation would not have likely made a difference. 
Even if Defendant could show deficient performance or obvious error, he 
cannot shown that he was prejudiced. The ineffective assistance of counsel and 
plain error standards share a "cmnmon standard" of prejudice. State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, if31 n.14, 12 P.3d 92. "Under either theory, a defendant 
must demonstrate that, absent the error or deficient performance, 'there is a 
reasonable probability of a more favorable result."' State v. McNeil, 2013 UT 
App 134, ~42, 302 P.3d 844 (quoting State v. King, 2010 UT App 396, ,I 20, 248 
P.3d 984). Defendant has not made that showing. 
Defendant has not shown that any lack of evidence or argument 
regarding his rehabilitative potential prejudiced him because the juvenile court 
not only heard evidence and argument on that issue, but it also considered it 
and found that it would be in his best interests to remain in juvenile court. 
Defendant's father testified that he believed it would be in Defendant's best 
interest to stay in juvenile court, where he would have an opportunity for 
rehabilitation, because Defendant was "a motivated child." R349. Defendant's 
mother likewise testified that she believed Defendant was "fully rehabilitatable 
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and reformable." R353. And Defendant's trial counsel argued that Defendant 
could be rehabilitated in the juvenile system. R361-62,369-70. 
Even though the SYOA did not allow the juvenile court to consider 
Defendant's rehabilitative potential, the juvenile court nevertheless considered 
it. R374-75. As explained, the juvenile court recognized that" [t]here are more 
rehabilitative services . . . available in the juvenile system than in the adult 
system." R374-75. The court therefore found that Defendant had shown that it 
was in his best interests to stay in juvenile court. JR31. As explained, however, 
the juvenile court nevertheless bound Defendant over to district court because 
he had not shown that keeping him in juvenile court was in the public's best 
interest. JR31. 
The juvenile court made its decision after rece1vmg and considering 
evidence about Defendant's rehabilitative potential. Defendant therefore has 
not shown that he was prejudiced by any lack of evidence or argument on that 
consideration. 
Nor has Defendant shown that the lack of a psychological evaluation 
prejudiced him. The juvenile court bound Defendant over to district court 
because it was concerned that he knowingly facilitated violent crimes by 
providing guns, he participated in those crimes, and, at 16, he would be under 
its jurisdiction for only a limited time. JR28-31. The psychological evaluation 
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that Defendant now proffers does not undermine any of those facts. R406-413. 
Rather, it confirms that Defendant's description of the crimes "was generally 
consistent" with the information in the police reports, witness statements, 
suspect statements, and charging documents. R406,411. The evaluation 
attempts to explain why Defendant should be viewed as less culpable despite 
his participation. R406-13. But Defendant has not shown that the evaluation 
would have likely made a difference given the juvenile court's focus on 
Defendant's age and on his facilitation of, and participation in, violent crimes. 
JR28-31. Because the psychological evaluation did not refute or even 
undermine those facts, Defendant has not shown that it likely would have made 
a difference. 
II. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THE JUVENILE COURT ABUSED 
ITS DISCRETION IN BINDING HIM OVER TO DISTRICT COURT 
Defendant also argues in his Point II that the juvenile court misapplied 
the SYOA factors to the evidence and erroneously found that he had not carried 
his burden to rebut the presumption that he should be bound over to district 
court. Br.Aplt. 31-44. Defendant has not shown that the juvenile court clearly 
erred in making findings under the SYOA factors, or that the court abused its 
discretion in ultimately binding Defendant over to district court. 
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A. This Court should review the juvenile court's order for abuse of 
discretion. 
This Court has yet to review a juvenile court's decision to bind a 
defendant over to adult court under the 2013 SYOA amendments.4 Under the 
previous version of the statute, a juvenile court's decision was entitled to only 
"limited deference." In re I.R.C., 2010 UT 41, i-112, 232 P.3d 1040. But as 
explained, juvenile courts previously had only limited discretion under the 
SYOA. A juvenile court now has greater discretion because its decision is a 
best-interest determination based on its weighing of enumerated factors. 
Decisions requiring balancing traditionally invoke an abuse of discretion 
standard. See, e.g., State v. Moa, 2012 UT 28, 134, 282 P.3d 985 ("When 
evaluating a sentencing determination, we traditionally afford the district court 
wide latitude and discretion.") (citation, alterations, and quotations omitted); 
State v. Ruiz, 2014 UT App 143, 1139, 329 P.3d 836 (reviewing for abuse of 
discretion trial court decision on balancing test under rule 403, Utah Rules of 
Evidence). Balancing is afforded great deference because-like highly fact-
dependent administrative decisions- it does not lend itself "to consistent 
resolution by a uniform body of appellate precedent" and the lower court "is in 
4 In re F.L., 20140130-CA, which has been argued but not yet decided, 
presents the question of the proper standard of review for post-2013 SYOA 
determinations. 
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a superior position to decide" it. Jex v. Labor Comm'n, 2013 UT 40, ,I15, 306 P.3d 
799. 
The new "best interests" standard is quintessentially a balancing test -
and therefore discretionary. See, e.g., Doyle v. Doyle, 2011 UT 42, ,I40, 258 P.3d 
553 (applying abuse of discretion standard in child custody proceedings 
involving "best interests" standard). A juvenile's "best interests" will depend 
on the facts of each case and the juvenile court's personal observations and 
specialized experience. 
Juvenile courts have "special training, experience, and interest" in 
dealing with minors. In re R.B., 2012 UT App 37, ,I9, 271 P.3d 827; see also In re 
N.A.D., 2014 UT App 249, ,Il0, 772 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (same); In re J.N., 2011 UT 
App 413, ,I2, 267 P.3d 787 (same). This further justifies deference to their 
decisions. As explained, juvenile systems exist because of the general 
understanding that minors are less culpable and have greater prospects of 
rehabilitation than adults. Cf State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, if 16, 63 P.3d 667 
( discussing reasonable legislative distinction in creating juvenile court for youth 
offenders "who are still in their formative years"). But there are exceptions to 
the general rule. Because juvenile courts consistently work with all kinds of 
youth, those courts are in the best position to evaluate the best interests of the 
youth and the public. 
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This Court should therefore apply an abuse of discretion standard to the 
juvenile court's ultimate decision to bind Defendant over to the district court. 
An appellate court "can properly find abuse only if no reasonable person would 
~ take the view adopted by the trial court." Goggin v. Goggin, 2011 UT 76, ,r 26, 
267 P.3d 885. 
A juvenile court also makes factual findings in applying the SYOA factors 
to the evidence before it. See In re M.E.P., 2005 UT App 227, if15, 114 P.3d 596 
(citing State v. Lara, 2003 UT App 318, if9, 79 P.3d 951). Those "'underlying 
factual findings ... are reviewed for clear error."' See id. (quoting Laura, 2003 
UT App 318, if9). 
B. Defendant's relative culpability was significant. 
Defendant argues that the juvenile court erred by finding that the relative 
culpability factor weighed against him. Br.Aplt. 31-35. He argues that the court 
"did not articulate the culpability" of the codefendants and "did not actually 
find whether [Defendant] had a greater or lesser degree of culpability" as 
compared to his codefendants. Br.Aplt. 31. He argues that based on the facts of 
the crimes, and the fact that he was the youngest and s1nallest of the assailants, 
the juvenile court should have found that his "relative culpability was the 
lowest among the defendants'." Br.Aplt. 31 ( capitalization omitted). Defendant 
demonstrates no error in the juvenile court's analysis, however, because he does 
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not demonstrate, or even allege, that the juvenile court clearly erred in making 
its findings under this factor. 
As explained, Defendant must show that the juvenile court's findings 
under the SYOA factors here were clearly erroneous. In re M.E.P., 2005 UT App 
227, ifl5. This is a weighty burden. 11 A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only 
when, in light of the evidence supporting the finding, it is against the clear 
weight of the evidence." In re J.Q., 2014 UT App 84, ,r2, 325 P.3d 114 (citing In 
re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ifll, 21 P.3d 680). As mentioned, appellate courts 
afford a juvenile court's findings substantial deference because that court has 
11 
specialized experience and training" and the "ability to judge credibility 
firsthand." Id. Thus, when reviewing a juvenile court's factual findings, an 
appellate court may not reweigh the evidence. Rather, it must ask only whether 
"'a foundation for the court's decision exists in the evidence."' Id. (quoting In re 
B.R., 2007 UT 82, if 12, 171 P.3d 435). 
The juvenile court's findings on this factor were not clearly erroneous. As 
explained, the court expressly c01npared Defendant's culpability to his 
codefendants' and found that "his culpability was significant." JR29. The court 
specifically found that his involvement at the crime scene was "less ... than 
others" because he did not wield a weapon. JR29. But it nevertheless found 
that his overall culpability was" significant" because: 
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• Defendant was involved in planning the robberies; 
• this "planning occurred over a period of time and was not a spur of 
the moment decision"; 
• Defendant "provided the guns knowing they would be used in the 
burglary and robberies"; and 
• Defendant "was present and assisted in the forced entrance into the 
home." 
JR29. 
These findings had ample support in the evidence. In text messages the 
day before the crimes, Defendant agreed to participate in a robbery and to bring 
his gun. R268;SE1. The juvenile court also heard evidence that everyone in the 
group agreed to the plan to rob the victim of marijuana. R288. Defendant 
admitted that he supplied two of the guns used in the robberies and 
participated in the robberies. R294,295-96. 
Defendant does not even acknowledge his burden to show that the 
juvenile court's findings were clearly erroneous. Instead, he merely reargues 
the evidence before the juvenile court in the light most favorable to him. 
Br.Aplt. 31-35. He emphasizes his statement to police in which he claimed that 
he thought his friends wanted hin1 to bring his guns only for target shooting. 
Br.Aplt. 32-33 ( citing R295-96,450). He also argues that the text messages the 
day before the crimes discussing guns and robberies were just jokes and did not 
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refer to these crimes because they were not actually planned until the next day. 
Br.Aplt. 32-34. 
The juvenile court was not required to adopt Defendant's view of the 
evidence. As the factfinder, the juvenile court was "in the best position to 
weigh conflicting testimony, to assess credibility, and from such 
determinations, render findings of fact," especially given its specialized 
expertise in dealing with juveniles. In re Z.H., 2013 UT App 195, ,r2, 307 P.3d 
691. Indeed, the juvenile court was "the exclusive judge of both the credibility 
of witnesses and the weight to be given [to] particular evidence" because it was 
the factfinder here. Cf State v. Black, 2015 UT App 30, if 19, 344 P.3d 644 Gury, as 
factfinder, is exclusive judge of credibility and weight to be given evidence). 
The juvenile court was free to disregard Defendant's self-serving 
statement and his interpretation of the text messages. It was also free to credit 
the evidence that Defendant knew that his friends wanted the guns to commit a 
home-invasion robbery. This evidence included: (1) text messages the day 
before the crimes in which Defendant agreed to participate in a robbery and 
bring a gun, R268-70;SE1; (2) text messages the day after the crimes in which 
Defendant expressed interest in possibly comn1itting another robbery, R271-
72;SE1; (3) the fact that one of the guns Defendant brought would have been 
useless for target practice because it did not have a firing pin, and therefore 
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could not fire bullets, R296; and (4) evidence that everyone agreed to the 
planned robbery, R288. 
The evidence amply supported the juvenile court's finding that 
Defendant's relative culpability was II significant" and that this factor weighed 
against him, even though he was the youngest and smallest of the assailants, 
and did not wield a weapon. JR29. Defendant therefore has not shown that the 
juvenile court's findings on relative culpability were clearly erroneous. 
Nor has Defendant shown that the juvenile court erred by not expressly 
finding "whether [he] had a greater or lesser degree of culpability in 
comparison" to his codefendants. Br.Aplt. 31. The statute did not require such 
express findings. See Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702(3)(c)(ii). Rather, it required 
only that the court II consider" relative culpability. See id. The juvenile court did 
so and, as mentioned, found that Defendant's relative culpability was 
"significant." JR29. 
Defendant also argues that the juvenile court should have sua sponte 
required a psychological evaluation of Defendant. Br.Aplt. 35. He clain1s that 
such an evaluation would have shown that his immaturity made hin1 
"susceptible to peer pressure." Id. But as explained, the statute did not plainly 
require or even allow consideration of a psychological evaluation. See Utah 
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Code Ann. §78A-6-702(3)(c). The juvenile court therefore did not err by not sua 
sponte ordering a psychological evaluation. 
C. Def end ant's role was violent, aggressive, and premeditated. 
Defendant argues that the juvenile court erred in finding that his role in 
the offence was violent, aggressive, or premeditated. Br.Aplt. 35-38. He 
contends that he did not threaten anyone, that the codefendants did most of the 
planning, and that the juvenile court improperly attributed the codefendants' 
actions to him. Br.Aplt. 35-38. Defendant has not shown that the juvenile court 
clearly erred because he again merely reargues the evidence in a light most 
favorable to him. 
The juvenile court's findings on this factor were not clearly erroneous. As 
explained, the juvenile court found that Defendant knowingly facilitated violent 
crimes by providing guns to his friends, and then participated in those crimes 
himself. JR29-30. The court also found that even though Defendant may not 
have wielded a weapon in the victim's home, his uninvited presence "by itself, 
was a threat to the victhns and a danger to others who were in or could have 
come into the home." JR29-30. Again, these findings were supported by 
Defendant's ad1nissions, text messages, and the other evidence detailed above. 
R268 ,288 ,294,295-96 ;SEl. 
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Defendant complains that the juvenile court improperly imputed his 
codefendants' violent actions to him, in violation of State v. Lara, 2003 UT App 
318, ,28, 79 P.3d 951. Br.Aplt. 36-38. In Lara, the juvenile court bound the 
defendant over to district court under the SYOA to face a charge of aggravated 
robbery after finding that he was an accomplice to a violent carjacking. 2003 UT 
App 318, 127. But Lara's only role was to drive the stolen truck away. Id. 1126, 
32. Lara became involved only after his friends had forced the driver from the 
truck at gunpoint and then ordered Lara to drive the truck because neither of 
them could operate a standard transmission. See id. This Court reversed the 
juvenile court's bindover order, because the juvenile court erroneously focused 
11 on the actions of the other participants." Id. if 28. 
The juvenile court here did not make the same mistake. Rather, it 
focused on Defendant's actions, not his codefendants'. JR29-30. The juvenile 
court recognized that Defendant did not have a weapon in the home and that it 
was the codefendants who forced their way at gun point into the victim's home. 
JR29. The court nevertheless found that Defendant's role was violent, 
aggressive, and premeditated because he" facilitated" the violence in the hmne 
by supplying guns, knowing that they "were intended to be used in a burglary 
and robbery for drugs." JR30. The court further found that Defendant's 
uninvited presence in the home was II itself ... a threat to the victims." JR30. 
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Thus, unlike the court in Lara, the juvenile court here based its findings on 
Defendant's actions. 
Defendant points out that the guns he supplied were not loaded. Br.Aplt. 
40. But he does not explain why this reduces his culpability where he provided 
the guns knowing that the group would use them as if they were loaded to 
commit a home-invasion robbery. Defendant therefore has not shown that the 
trial court clearly erred in making its findings under this factor. 
D. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in weighing 
Defendant's lack of a juvenile court record. 
Defendant complains about how the juvenile court phrased findings that 
it made in his favor regarding his lack of any history of delinquency. Br.Aplt. 
42. He argues that in finding that he had proven the first factor-no prior 
weapons-related offenses in juvenile court- the juvenile court merely stated 
that Defendant had no prior juvenile record, without expressly recognizing that 
he had no prior weapons-related offenses. Br.Aplt. 42. Defendant argues that 
recognizing the full nature of this factor II demonstrates the egregious type of 
juvenile history that might normally justify transferring a minor into adult 
court." Br.Aplt. 42. In other words, Defendant argues that the juvenile court 
did not weigh this factor n1ore heavily in his favor. 
Defendant has not shown that the juveni]e court abused its discretion. 
The court found that the first and fourth factors - both involving Defendant's 
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history of delinquency-weighed in Defendant's favor. JR28,30. It nevertheless 
found that those factors did not outweigh Defendant's having knowingly 
facilitated violent crimes by supplying guns, and then participating in those 
crimes. JR28-31. Defendant's disagreement with the juvenile court's weighing 
of the SYOA factors does not show that the juvenile court abused its discretion 
in ultimately finding that the combined factors weighed in favor of binding him 
over to district court. 
E. Defendant did not show that public safety was better served by 
retaining his case in juvenile court. 
Defendant's argument on this factor rests primarily on his contention that 
public safety required the juvenile court to consider his rehabilitative potential 
and n1ental condition. Br.Aplt. 16-24, 38-44. As shown, however, the 2013 
SYOA amendments did not. Rather, in determining what would best serve 
public safety, the juvenile court considered Defendant's age, juvenile court 
history, role in the offense and relative culpability, and the longer incarceration 
and supervision terms available in the adult system. JR28-31. 
Defendant argues that his counsel should have argued, and the juvenile 
court should have recognized, that incarcerating him in the adult system would 
jeopardize his safety. Br.Aplt. 22-24. He argues that juveniles incarcerated in 
the adult system "are more likely to be physically and sexually abused while 
incarcerated." Br.Aplt. 22. He also contends that placing juveniles in solitary 
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confinement for their safety increases their likelihood of suicide and psychosis. 
Br.Aplt. 24. The Utah Juvenile Defender Attorneys have filed an amicus curiae 
brief contending that the adult correctional system cannot meet youth 
-offenders' needs and is a dangerous place for them. Amicus Br. 5-23. But the 
relevant inquiry under the SYOA's fifth factor was the public's safety, not 
Defendant's. Thus, Defendant's and Amicus' s arguments are misplaced. 
In any event, the juvenile court considered Defendant's interests and 
vulnerabilities and concluded that remaining in juvenile court was in his best 
interests. JR31. Thus, the juvenile court did not ignore Defendant's interests. 
Rather, it found that the public's interests outweighed Defendant's interests 
given the seriousness of his crimes, his age, and the limited sanctions available 
in juvenile court. 
Given the facts here, the juvenile court reasonably concluded that 
"[p ]ublic safety requires a strong[ er] response and longer correctional period 
than is available in the juvenile court." JR30. Defendant therefore has not 
shown that the juvenile court abused its discretion in concluding that he did not 
show by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the public's best interest 
for his case to remain in juvenile court. See Goggin v. Goggin, 2011 UT 76, 126, 
267 P.3d 885 (an appellate court "can properly find abuse only if no reasonable 
person would take the view adopted by the trial court"). 
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III. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL WAS 
INEFFECTIVE AT THE SYOA HEARING 
In his point II(D), Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective in 
handling the evidence at the SYOA hearing and in allowing his hearing to be 
conducted jointly with his codefendant Joshua Dutson. Br.Aplt. 25-31. 
Defendant has not shown that his counsel was deficient in handling the 
evidence, because he asserts only that his trial counsel could have made 
different arguments. Nor has he shown prejudice, because none of the 
arguments that he now contends his counsel should have made would have 
likely caused the juvenile court to change its mind. As for holding a joint 
hearing, the record discloses a reasonable tactical basis for doing so, and 
Defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by any of the evidence that he 
now complains was erroneously admitted because of his codefendant' s 
participation. 
A. Defendant has not shown that trial counsel performed 
deficiently in arguing the evidence. 
Defendant argues that his counsel should have made several different 
arguments about the evidence before the juvenile court. But the fact that trial 
counsel could have en1ployed II another, possibly more reasonable or effective 
strategy" does not prove that trial counsel was deficient. State v. Lucero, 2014 
UT 15, ,I42, 328 P.3d 841. 
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Defendant argues that his counsel should have emphasized that 
Defendant was the youngest of the intruders, the second smallest, and had no 
criminal history. Br.Aplt. 25. But counsel could have reasonable decided that 
this was unnecessary where the juvenile court knew Defendant's age, knew the 
codefendants' ages, and could see Defendant's size. R242,363. The prosecution 
also stipulated, and the juvenile court found, that Defendant had no history of 
delinquency. JR28-30;R320-21,362,371. 
Defendant argues that his counsel should have argued that the oldest of 
the codefendants "had multiple felony cases pending." Br.Aplt. 25. But counsel 
could have reasonably decided not to make this argument because none of the 
SYOA factors involve a codefendant' s criminal history. See Utah Code Ann. 
§78A-6-702(3)(c). Rather, they focus only on the codefendant' s involvement in 
the crime as compared to the defendant's. Id. §78A-6-702(3)(c)(ii). 
Defendant argues that his counsel should have ren1inded the juvenile 
court that under Lara, 2003 UT App 318, the court could not attribute the 
misconduct of codefendants to juvenile accomplices. Br.Aplt. 26. But as 
explained, the juvenile court based its decision on Defendant's actions, not on 
his codefendants' actions. The court found that Defendant facilitated the 
violent crimes by providing the guns and being present. JR29-30. Arguing that 
the court's findings were erroneous under Lara would have therefore been 
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futile. Counsel's omission of a futile objection is not deficient performance. 
State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160, if 36, 789 Utah Adv. Rep. 21. 
Defendant argues that his counsel should have elicited testimony that 
Defendant "wanted the police to agree to protect him before he was willing to 
acknowledge Wesley Brown's participation." Br.Aplt. 25. But the only record 
evidence that Defendant cites to support this proposition is a "Declaration" 
from his appellate counsel stating that she had reviewed Defendant's recorded 
interrogation and that Defendant requested protection before discussing 
Brown. Br.Aplt. 25 (citing R427, which in turn references R664). The record 
does not contain a recording or transcript of Defendant's interrogation, or an 
affidavit from Defendant establishing this fact. 
Regardless, even assuming that Defendant could establish that he wanted 
police protection before revealing Brown's participation, Defendant cannot 
show that his counsel was ineffective for not eliciting this fact. Defendant does 
not explain why this fact was so crucial that all reasonable counsel would have 
elicited it. Br.Aplt. 25. Instead, he leaves this Court to speculate about its 
relevancy. 
The relevance of this alleged fact is not so obvious that all reasonable 
counsel would have recognized and exploited it. Defendant's alleged hesitancy 
to reveal Brown's participation does not establish that Brown intimidated 
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Defendant into participating in the crimes. On the contrary, Defendant's text 
messages and his agreement with Brown's plan demonstrate that Defendant 
was a willing· participant. Defendant therefore has not shown deficient 
performance. ~ 
Defendant argues that his counsel should have introduced Dexter 
Skinner's comments during his arrest and interrogation expressing shock and 
regret that sixteen-year-olds were arrested and that Defendant, "a good kid," 
had been involved. Br.Aplt. 25. But counsel could reasonably decide not to 
affirmatively introduce evidence that Defendant was involved in the robberies. 
Counsel could also have reasonably decided that the juvenile court would place 
little, if any weight, on a codefendant's assessment of Defendant's character. 
Defendant argues that his counsel should have challenged victim 
Christian Davidson's claim that this was a home-invasion robbery. Br.Aplt. 26-
28. Defendant argues that Davidson gave inconsistent statements about the 
initial entry and that there was some evidence that the group did not forcefully 
enter the home. Br.Aplt. 26-28. 
Defendant proffers no evidence to contradict the victims' statements that 
once inside the hon1e, the intruders robbed the victims at gunpoint. In fact, 
Dexter Skinner confessed that he and Brown drew their guns, commanded the 
victims "to get down on the ground and told them they were taking their 
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weed." R237. Defendant likewise confessed that the group robbed the victims 
at gunpoint. R295. Given this evidence, counsel could have reasonably 
concluded that the juvenile court would find that the group robbed the victims 
at gunpoint in Davidson's home, regardless of how the group initially entered 
that home. Given that reality, counsel could have reasonably decided not to 
nitpick Davidson's testimony about the initial forced entry. 
In sum, Defendant has not shown that his counsel's arguing of the 
evidence was objectively unreasonable. 
B. Defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced because none 
of the arguments he now makes would have undermined the 
basis for the juvenile court's ruling. 
Even if Defendant had shown that his trial counsel should have argued 
the evidence differently, Defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced. As 
explained, the juvenile court based its decision on the fact that Defendant 
knowingly facilitated violent crimes and also participated in those crimes. 
JR28-31. Defendant admitted these facts and none of the arguments that 
Defendant now claims his trial counsel should have made undern1ine his 
admissions. Defendant therefore has not shown prejudice. See Strickland v. 
WashiHgton, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (prejudice requires reasonable probability 
of different result). 
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C. Defendant has not shown that his counsel was ineffective for 
agreeing to a joint hearing. 
Defendant argues that his counsel should have objected to holding his 
SYOA bindover hearing jointly with codefendant Joshua Dutson. Br.Aplt. 28-
30. Defendant argues that this allowed the juvenile court to hear otherwise 
inadmissible hearsay that (1) the group allegedly committed other robberies, (2) 
the group all agreed on Brown's plan to rob the victims, and (3) Defendant held 
a gun or a switchblade during the robberies. Br.Aplt. 28-30. 
Defendant has not shown that his counsel was ineffective, because the 
record discloses a reasonable strategic explanation for holding a joint hearing. 
As mentioned, the SYOA required the juvenile court to compare Defendant's 
conduct with that of his codefendants. See Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702(3)(c)(ii). 
The evidence demonstrated, and the juvenile court ultimately found, that 
Defendant's participation at the crin1e scene was "less ... than others" because 
he did not wield a weapon while others, including Dutson, did. 
R284,287,299;JR29. Dutson confessed to wielding a gun during the robberies. 
R284,287. The evidence was conflicting, however, as to whether Defendant did. 
R253,284,287,299. Trial counsel could have therefore reasonably concluded that 
juxtaposing Defendant's participation with Dutson' s would benefit Defendant. 
Indeed, that strategy was partia 11y successfu 1 because it produced a finding that 
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Defendant's participation at the crime scene was less than that of his 
codefendants. JR29. 
As mentioned, to prove that his trial counsel's performance was 
objectively unreasonable, Defendant must prove that "there was no conceivable 
tactical basis" for his counsel's actions. State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, iJ6, 89 P.3d 
162 (quotation and citation omitted). The record here discloses a tactical-and 
partially successful - basis for holding Defendant's SYOA hearing together with 
Dutson's. The fact that this strategy was not completely successful does not 
undermine its reasonableness. See State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1258 (Utah 1993) 
(" A defendant is not guaranteed successful assistance of counsel, and 
competency of counsel is not measured by the result.") (quotations and citations 
omitted). 
Moreover, Defendant has not shown that it was objectively unreasonable 
for his counsel not to object to the hearsay evidence that he now identifies. 
Defendant recognizes that, under rule 220), Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 
hearsay is ad1nissible in a SYOA preliminary hearing. Br.Aplt. 28. Defendant 
nevertheless argues that hearsay is not admissible in the portion of the hearing 
addressing the SYOA factors, because rule 23A(d), Utah Rules of Juvenile 
Procedure, gives a Defendant the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses at 
the hearing. Br.Aplt. 28. But the fact that a defendant has the right to cross-
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examme adverse witnesses at a hearing does not mean that hearsay is 
inadmissible. On the contrary, hearsay is admissible at preliminary hearings in 
adult court even though defendants have the right to cross-examine the 
prosecution's witnesses. See Utah R. Evid. 1102(a) ("Reliable hearsay is 
admissible at criminal preliminary examinations"); Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(1) 
(granting a defendant the opportunity to II cross-examine adverse witnesses" at 
a preliminary hearing in district court). Because Defendant has not shown that 
hearsay is obviously inadmissible at a SYOA preliminary hearing, he has not 
shown that his counsel was deficient for not objecting to the hearsay he now 
challenges. 
Nor has Defendant proven prejudice. Defendant complains that because 
of the joint hearing, the juvenile court heard evidence that Dutson told police 
about other robberies Defendant and his cohorts committed. Br.Aplt. 29-30. 
But Defendant points to nothing in the record that even suggests that this 
evidence affected the juvenile court's decision, especially where the detective 
admitted that Defendant was not involved in any other robberies. 
Detective Barker admitted that he received conflicting accounts about 
other robberies. R285-86. He ultimately agreed on cross-examination that 
11 there were no other incidents" that Defendant and Dutson were involved in. 
R307. The prosecution did not rely on the allegations of other robberies, nor did 
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the juvenile court mention those allegations in making its decision. R362-
67,370-75;JR28-31. 
Defendant also complains about Dutson's statement that everyone agreed 
to the robbery plan. Br.Aplt. 30. But Defendant's own text messages 
established that a robbery was planned and that he would participate and 
provide guns. R268-72;SE1. Defendant argues that the text messages were 
jokes and that the robbery here was not planned until the day after the texts. 
Br.Aplt. 34. But as explained, the juvenile court was not required to accept 
Defendant's interpretation of the evidence. 
Finally, Defendant complains that the juvenile court heard Dutson' s 
statement that Defendant wielded a gun or a knife during the robberies. 
Br.Aplt. 30. But the juvenile court found that Defendant did not wield any 
weapon. JR29. 
Defendant has not proven that any of the hearsay evidence effected the 
juvenile court's decision. Defendant therefore has not proven prejudice. See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
IV. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THE JUVENILE COURT JUDGE 
PLAINLY ERRED BY NOT SUA SPONTE RECUSING HERSELF WHERE NO 
CONTROLLING AUTHORITY REQUIRED RECUSAL 
In his point III, Defendant argues that the juvenile court judge plainly 
erred by not recusing herself. Br.Aplt. 44-52. Defendant asserts that recusal 
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was appropriate because: (1) the judge is married to the Chief Criminal Deputy 
in the Weber County Attorney's Office, the prosecuting entity; and (2) the judge 
was a former prosecutor who worked in that office. Br.Aplt. 45. Defendant has 
not shown that the juvenile court plainly erred because no controlling authority 
plainly required the judge to recuse herself. 
A. The judge's marriage did not plainly require recusal. 
Defendant argues that rule 2.11 of the Code of Judicial Conduct "tacitly 
recognizes" that the judge should have recused herself. Br.Aplt. 46-48. That 
rules requires a judge to "disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in 
which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including" 
when the judge's spouse is "a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, 
general partner, managing member, or trustee of a party." Utah R. Jud. 
Conduct 2.ll(A)(2)(a). 
As Defendant recognizes, the plain language of this rule did not require 
recusal. Defendant argues only that the rule "tacitly" recognized that the 
judge's marriage to a supervisor in the prosecutor's office required recusal. 
Br.Aplt. 47. But an error is obvious only when it violates "the plain language of 
the relevant statute," not its "tacit" implications. Isom, 2015 UT App 160, if 28. 
Regardless, the language did not even "tacitly" require recusal here. A 
prosecutor is not a party to a criminal action, nor is he an "officer, director, 
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general partner, managing member, or trustee" of the State of Utah in the sense 
that those terms are used in rule 2.11. See Utah R. Jud. Conduct 2.ll(A)(2)(a). 
Rather, the rule requires recusal only when the judge's spouse is an actual 
party, or so closely aligned with a party, that the spouse has a direct interest in 
the litigation. 
Prosecutors have no direct interest in criminal cases, and especially not in 
cases where they are not representing the State. Defendant cites no controlling 
authority interpreting rule 2.11 as he now does. 
Based on a footnote in Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 830 P.2d 252, 
255 n.1 (Utah 1992), Defendant argues that an attorney for a party can be 
considered to be "the party itself." Br.Aplt. 47. That was not Reichert's holding. 
On the contrary, the Utah Supreme Court expressly declined to consider 
"whether an attorney is a 'party'" because that issue was "not essential to the 
determination" there. Reichert, 830 P.2d at 255 n.1. Thus, Reichert does not 
establish that the juvenile court judge should have plainly recognized that by 
being married to a prosecutor, she was actually married to the State of Utah. 
Defendant argues that recusal was required because even if the judge's 
husband was not a party, he became involved in Defendant's case "after 
[Defendant] went to prison" and Defendant's appellate counsel began 
requesting documents. Br.Aplt. 47-48. But even if the judge's husband's later 
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involvement with appellate counsel's post-sentencing document requests in 
district court could be enough to require the juvenile court judge to disqualify 
herself, it cannot establish that the judge plainly erred by not doing so. The 
involvement that Defendant identifies occurred long after his case was 
transferred to adult court, and even after he was convicted and sentenced. 
Br.Aplt. 47-48. The prosecutor who did handle the case explained that although 
the judge's husband was the Chief Criminal Deputy in the Weber County 
Attorney's Office, he had nothing to do with this case in juvenile court, did not 
supervise juvenile court attorneys, and was not involved in any juvenile court 
matters. R504-05. Because her spouse was not involved in Defendant's case 
while it was before her, the juvenile court judge's marriage did not require her 
sua sponte recusal. 
Non-controlling authority supports that conclusion. In State v. Harrell, 
546 N.W.2d 115, 116-18 (Wis. 1996), the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the 
argun1ent that a judge's marriage to a prosecutor in the office prosecuting the 
defendant required the judge to recuse himself. The court observed that "the 
special characteristics of government attorneys make it unlikely that a judge's 
relationship with one would affect his or her impartiality." Id. at 118. 
Prosecutors do "not have the same type of interest in the outcome of a trial as 
does a member of a private law firm" because a prosecutor "has no financial 
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interest in the outcome of the case and any reputational interest 'without the 
financial interest✓ is not enough to create [even] an appearance of partiality [in 
the judge]."' Id. (quoting State v. Logan, 689 P.2d 778, 785 (Kan. 1984)). The 
court found the "thought that a judge would have an increased propensity to 
convict criminals because of such a relationship" to be II preposterous." Id. 
(quotation and citation omitted). 
Defendant relies on a Colorado case, Smith v. Beckman, 683 P.2d 1214 
(Colo. 1984), to support his claim that a judge's marriage to a prosecutor creates 
an appearance of impropriety, even when the prosecutor-spouse is not involved 
in the case before the judge. Br.Aplt. 45, 51-52. But his non-binding precedent 
cannot show that the juvenile court plainly erred. See Isom, 2015 UT App 160, 
if 28 (to be plain, error must contravene settled appellate law). 
Even if Beckman were relevant to Defendant's claim of plain error, it 
would not be persuasive. As the Minnesota Court of Appeals has observed, the 
11 the reasoning of Beckman, a 1984 decision, runs counter to that of the great 
majority of subsequent cases." In re Jacobs, 791 N.W.2d 300, 302 (Mim1. App. 
2010). Like those subsequent cases, the Minnesota Court of Appeals refused to 
hold "that the institutional loyalty of a prosecutor-spouse could reasonably 
appear to affect the impartiality of the judge-spouse." Id. at 303. Thus, 
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Defendant has not shown that the juvenile court judge's marriage obviously 
required her to sua sponte recuse herself. 
B. The judge's former employment as a prosecutor did not plainly 
require recusal. 
Defendant also argues that section 78A-2-222 plainly required the judge 
to either obtain the consent of the parties to preside over the case or recuse 
herself. Br.Aplt. 48-51. Subsection (l)(b) of that statute prohibits a judge from 
hearing a case in which she "is related to either party by consanguinity or 
affinity within the third degree" unless the parties consent. Utah Code Ann. 
§78A-2-222(1)(b) (West 2009). Subsection (l)(c) prohibits a judge from hearing a 
case "when he has been attorney or counsel for either party in the action or 
proceeding" unless the parties consent. Id. §78A-2-222(1)(c). Defendant argues 
that recusal was plainly required under both subsections. Br.Aplt. 45-52. 
Defendant again argues that because Reichert defined "party" to include 
the party's attorneys, the juvenile court judge here was married to a party: the 
State of Utah. Br.Aplt. 48. As explained, however, that was not Reichert's 
holding. Thus, Defendant has not shown that subsection (l)(b) plainly required 
recusal. 
Nor did subsection (l)(c) require recusal, even though the judge had 
previously worked as a prosecutor. On the contrary, this Court has held that 
this subsection does not require a judge to "recuse herself in every case ... 
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where her former employer participates as counsel in the proceeding on a 
matter in which the judge herself never participated." See Kunej v. Labor 
Commission, 2013 UT App 172, ,I19, 306 P.3d 855 (citing In re Affidavit of Bias, 947 
vJ P.2d 1152, 1155 (Utah 1997)). 
Kunej brought an employment discrimination claim against the 
University of Utah. Id. at ,r1. The Utah Attorney General's Office represented 
the University. Id. if 18. The administrative law judge who heard the case had 
previously worked for both the University and the Attorney General's Office. 
Id. ,I18. But her former employment did not require the judge to recuse herself 
under section 78A-2-222(1)(c) where nothing suggested "any connection 
between the present litigation and any matters" the judge was involved in 
during her previous employment. Id. ,I19. 
Likewise, nothing in this record shows, or even suggests, that the judge 
had any involvement in Defendant's case when she worked as a prosecutor. 
According to her online biography, the judge left the prosecutor's office in 1995, 
two years before Defendant was born. See Second District Juvenile Court 
Judges' Biographies,(www.utcourts.gov/judgesbios/ showGallery.asp?dist=2& 
ct_type=J). Defendant therefore has not shown that the judge erred, let alone 
plainly erred, by not recusing herself. 
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C. Defendant has not shown prejudice. 
Even if Defendant had shown that recusal was plainly required, he has 
not shown prejudice, as he must to establish plain error. Defendant does not 
allege that the juvenile court here was biased. Br.Aplt. 44-52. Rather, he asserts 
that the judge's marriage created only an "appearance of impropriety" and a 
"reasonable inference" of bias. Br.Aplt. 45, 51. But appearances and inferences 
do not establish actual bias. See State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 611-12 (Utah App. 
1997) (affidavits showing appearance of bias insufficient to show actual bias). 
Defendant therefore has not carried his burden to show plain error. See Isom, 
2015 UT App 160, 128. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on August 5, 2015. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
cHRISTHERD. BALLARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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UTAH CODE ANN. 
§78A-6-701 (West Supp 2013). Jurisdiction of district court 
(1) The district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over all persons 16 years 
of age or older charged with: 
(a) an offense which would be murder or aggravated murder if committed by 
an adult; or 
(b) an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult if the minor 
has been previously committed to a secure facility as defined in Section 62A-
7-101. This Subsection (l)(b) shall not apply if the offense is committed in a 
secure facility. 
(2) When the district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a minor under 
this section, it also has exclusive original jurisdiction over the minor regarding all 
offenses joined with the qualifying offense, and any other offenses, including 
misdemeanors, arising from the same criminal episode. The district court is not 
divested of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that the minor is allowed to enter a 
plea to, or is found guilty of, a lesser or joined offense. 
(3)(a) Any felony, misdemeanor, or infraction committed after the offense over 
which the district court takes jurisdiction under Subsection (1) or (2) shall be 
tried against the defendant as an adult in the district court or justice court having 
jurisdiction. 
(b) If the qualifying charge under Subsection (1) results in an acquittal, a 
finding of not guilty, or a dismissal of the charge in the district court, the 
juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice 
Services regain any jurisdiction and authority previously exercised over the 
minor. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 445, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2010, c. 38, § 6, eff. March 22, 2010. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2010, c. 38, § 6, in subsec. (1), substituted "has" for" shall have" and deleted 
"by information or indictment" following" charged". 
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§ 78A-6-702 (West Supp. 2013). Serious youth offender--Procedure 
(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general 
charging a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by criminal 
infonnation and filed in the juvenile court if the information charges any of the 
following offenses: 
(a) any felony violation of: 
(i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson; 
(ii) Section 76-5-103, aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury 
to another; 
(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnapping; 
(iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary; 
(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery; 
(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; 
(vii) Section 76-10-508.1, felony discharge of a firearm; 
(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder; or 
(ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder; or 
(b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection (1)(a) involving the use of a 
dangerous weapon, which would be a felony if committed by an adult, and 
the minor has been previously adjudicated or convicted of an offense 
involving the use of a dangerous weapon, which also would have been a 
felony if committed by an adult. 
(2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under 
Subsection (1) shall be conducted in conformity ,vith the rules established by the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
(3)(a) If the information alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsection (1), 
the state shall have the burden of going forward with its case and the burden of 
proof to establish probable cause to believe that one of the crimes listed in 
Subsection (1) has been committed and that the defendant committed it. If 
proceeding under Subsection (l )(b), the state shal] have the additional burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has previously 
been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous 
weapon. 
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(b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under this 
Subsection (3), the court shall order that the defendant be bound over and 
held to answer in the district court in the same manner as an adult unless the 
juvenile court judge finds that it would be conh·ary to the best interest of the 
minor and to the public to bind over the defendant to the jurisdiction of the 
dish·ict court. 
(c) In making the bind over determination in Subsection (3)(b), the judge shall 
consider only the following: 
(i) whether the minor has been previously adjudicated delinquent for an 
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony 
if committed by an adult; 
(ii) if the offense was committed with one or more other persons, whether 
the minor appears to have a greater or lesser degree of culpability than the 
codefendants; 
(iii) the extent to which the minor's role in the offense was committed in a 
violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner; 
(iv) the number and nature of the minor's prior adjudications in the 
juvenile court; and 
(v) whether public safety is better served by adjudicating the minor in the 
juvenile court or in the dish·ict court. 
(d) Once the state has met its burden under Subsection (3)(a) as to a showing 
of probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going forward and 
presenting evidence that in light of the considerations listed in Subsection 
(3)(c), it would be conb·ary to the best interest of the minor and the best 
interests of the public to bind the defendant over to the jurisdiction of the 
district court. 
(e) If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that it 
would be contrary to the best interest of the minor and the best interests of the 
public to bjnd the defendant over to the jurisdiction of the district court, the 
court shall so state in its findings and order the minor held for trial as a 111-inor 
and shall proceed upon the information as though it ,vere a juvenile petition. 
(-:!:) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been con-imHted, but that 
the state has not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to bind the 
defendant over under Subsection (1), the juvenile court judge shall order the 
defendant held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the information as 
though it were a juvenile petition. 
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(5) At the time of a bind over to district court a crhninal warrant of arrest shall 
issue. The defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other criminal 
defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile court judge. The 
juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail. 
(6) If an indichnent is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under this 
section, the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need not 
include a finding of probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment was 
committed and that the defendant committed it, but the juvenile court shall 
proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional considerations 
listed in Subsection (3)(b). 
(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same 
information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for 
one or more charges under this section, other offenses arising from the same 
criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against 
him shall be considered together with those charges, and where the court finds 
probable cause to believe that those crimes have been committed and that the 
defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound over to the district 
court to answer for those charges. 
(8) When a minor has been bound over to the dish·ict court under this section, the 
jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and the juvenile court over 
the minor is terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from 
the same criminal episode, and any subsequent misde1neanors or felonies 
charged against the minor, except as provided in Subsection (12). 
(9) A 1ninor who is bound over to answer as an adult in the dish·ict court under 
this section or on whom an indictment has been returned by a grand jury is not 
entitled to a preliminary examination in the dish·ict court. 
(10) Allegations contained in the indictment or information that the defendant 
has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a 
dangerous weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of the cri111.inal 
offense and do not need to be proven at h·ial in the d ish·ict court. 
(11) 1f a rninor enlers a plea to, or is found guiily of, any of the charges filed or 
any other offense arising from the same criminal episode, the district court 
retains jurisdktion over the minor for alJ purpnsr"\s/ including sentencing. 
(12) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile 
Justice Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over 
the minor when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all 
charges in the dish·ict court. 
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Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 446, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2010, c. 38, § 7, eff. March 22, 2010; 
Laws 2010, c. 218, § 39, eff. May 11, 2010; Laws 2012, c. 118, § 1, eff. May 8, 2012; 
Laws 2013, c. 186, § 1, eff. May 14, 2013. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2010, c. 38, § 7, inserted subsec. (8) and renumbered former subsecs. (8) to 
(11) as subsecs. (9) to (12). 
Laws 2010, c. 218, § 39, in subsec. (l)(a)(vii), substituted "76-10-508.1" for "76-10-
508", inserted "felony" and deleted "from a vehicle" following "firearm". 
Composite section by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel of 
Laws 2010, c. 38, § 7 and Laws 2010, c. 218, § 39. 
Laws 2012, c. 118, § 1, in subsec. (l)(a)(ii), substituted "Section 76-5-103, 
aggravated assault resulting in" for "Subsection 76-5-103(1)(a), aggravated 
assault, involving intentionally causing". 
Laws 2013, c. 186, § 1, in subsec. (l)(a)(iii), substituted "kidnapping" for 
"kidnaping"; and rewrote subsec. (3), which formerly read: 
"(3)(a) If the infonnation alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsection (1), 
the state shall have the burden of going forward with its case and the burden of 
proof to establish probable cause to believe that one of the crimes listed in 
Subsection (1) has been committed and that the defendant committed it. If 
proceeding under Subsection (1)(6), the state shall have the additional burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has previously 
been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous 
weapon. 
11 (b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under this 
Subsection (3), the court shal1 order that the defendant be bound over and held to 
answer in the district court in the same manner as an adult unless the juvenile 
court judge finds that all of the following conditions exist: 
"(i) the minor has not been previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense 
involving the use of a dangerous weapon which vvould be a felony if con1111itted 
by an adult; 
11 (ii) that if the offense was committed with one or more other persons, the n1inor 
appears to have a lesser degree of culpability than the codefendants; and 
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11 (iii) that the 1ninor' s role in the offense was not com1nitted in a violent, 
aggressive, or premeditated manner. 
11 (c) Once the state has met its burden under this Subsection (3) as to a showing 
of probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going forward and 
presenting evidence as to the existence of the above conditions. 
11 
( d) If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that all the 
above conditions are satisfied, the court shall so state in its findings and order the 
minor held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the information as though 
it were a juvenile petition." 
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§ 78A-6-703 (West Supp. 2013). Certification hearings--Juvenile court to hold 
preliminary hearing--Factors considered by juvenile court for waiver of 
jurisdiction to district court 
(1) If a criminal information filed in accordance with Subsection 78A-6-602(3) 
alleges the co1n1nission of an act which would constitute a felony if committed by 
an adult, the juvenile court shall conduct a preliminary hearing. 
(2) At the preliminary hearing the state shall have the burden of going forward 
with its case and the burden of establishing: 
(a) probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the 
defendant committed it; and 
(b) by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would be contrary to the best 
interests of the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain 
jurisdiction. 
(3) In considering whether or not it would be contrary to the best interests of the 
minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction, the juvenile 
court shall consider, and may base its decision on, the finding of one or more of 
the following factors: 
(a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the 
community requires isolation of the minor beyond that afforded by juvenile 
facilities; 
(b) whether the alleged offense was committed by the minor under 
circumstances which would subject the minor to enhanced penalties under 
Section 76-3-203.1 if the minor were adult and the offense was committed: 
(i) in concert with two or more persons; 
(ii) for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal 
street gang as defined in Section 76-9-802; or 
(iii) to gain recognition, acceptance, membership, or increased status vvith 
a criminal street gang as defined in Section 76-9-802; 
(r) ,,,.'l"ct}...,:-n• th(' ;-1l100·0 c11 offn11s 0 \.'\.',.,<:; ,--,-,11 ... r·--.•1·tt,~,i in ;'11"1 ;,o-o-,·0c_~;,_,/, • ,;olc·1:..L \'--- \·.I L-1 -·~ -·~~-ol.:.. _ ··'--- '-.. . Cl- \...'-'-.Lll • \\ .. di :.t • doo1-~~- l\ .._, \ 1 l / 
prern_editated, or willful manner; 
(d) ,vhcLhc 1 • the a.llegr:,d offc11s:.__0 W?:~ ag;.1inst pr"rsc1ns er property, greater 
weight being given to offenses against persons, except as provided in Section 
76-8-418; 
( e) the maturity of the 1ninor as determined by considerations of the minor's 
home, environment, emotional attitude, and pattern of living; 
. u 
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(f) the record and previous history of the minor; 
(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use of facilities available to 
the juvenile court; 
(h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court 
when the minor's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be 
charged with a crime in the district court; 
(i) whether the 1ninor used a firearm in the commission of an offense; and 
G) whether the minor possessed a dangerous weapon on or about school 
premises as provided in Section 76-10-505.5. 
(4) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in Subsection (3) 
is discretionary with the court. 
(S)(a) Written reports and other materials relating to the minor's mental, 
physical, educational, and social history may be considered by the court. 
(b) If requested by the minor, the minor's parent, guardian, or other interested 
party, the court shall require the person or agency preparing the report and 
other material to appear and be subject to both direct and cross-examination. 
(6) At the conclusion of the state's case, the minor may testify under oath, call 
witnesses, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and present evidence on the factors 
required by Subsection (3). 
(7) If the court finds the state has met its burden under Subsection (2), the court 
may enter an order: 
(a) certifying that finding; and 
(b) directing that the minor be held for criminal proceedings in the district 
court. 
(8) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury, the preliminary examination held 
by the juvenile court need not include a finding of probable cause, but the 
juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the 
additional consideration referred to in Subsection (2)(b). 
(9) The provisions of Section 78A-6-1l5, Section 'lSA-6-1111, and other provisions 
relating to proceedings in juvenile cases arc applicable to the hearing held under 
this section to the extent they are pertinent. 
(10) A minor who has been directed to be held for criminal proceedings in the 
district court is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the dislTict court. 
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(11) A minor who has been certified for trial in the district court shall have the 
same right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be advised of that 
Vil right by the juvenile court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in 
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail. 
(12) When a minor has been certified to the dish·ict court under this section, the 
jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and the jurisdiction of the 
ij juvenile court over the minor is tenninated regarding that offense, any other 
offenses arising from the same criminal episode, and any subsequent 
misdemeanors or felonies charged against the minor, except as provided in 
Subsection (14). 
~ (13) If a 1ninor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of any of the charges filed or on 
any other offense arising out of the same cri1ninal episode, the district court 
retains jurisdiction over the 111inor for all purposes, including sentencing. 
(14) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile 
~ Justice Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over 
the minor when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all 
charges in the district court. 
Credits 
l.iJ Laws 2008, c. 3, § 447, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2010, c. 38, § 8, eff. March 22, 2010; 
Laws 2010, c. 193, § 22, eff. Nov. 1, 2010. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2010, c. 38, § 8, in subsec. (12), deleted II or when a criminal information or 
indictment is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction before a committing 
magistrate charging the minor ,vith an offense described in Section 78A-6-702" 
following II section,". 
Laws 2010, c. 193, § 22, rewrote subsec. (3)(b), in subsec. (3)(e), substituted "the 
n1inor' s" for "his" and in subsec. (12), subs ti tu ted "the minor" for "him". Fonner 
subsec. (3)(6) read: 
"(b) ,vhether the alleged offense was committed by the minor in concert with hvo 
or 111.ore persons under circumstances \Vhich \vould subject the miner to 
enhanced penalties under Sce_'tion 7t,-3-203.1 \\.(·re he an adult:;"' 
Composite section by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel of 
Laws 2010, c. 38, § 8 and Laws 2010, c. 193, § 22. 
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§ 78A-2-222 (West 2009). Disqualification for interest or relation to parties 
(1) Except by consent of all parties, a justice, judge, or justice court judge may not 
sit or act in any action or proceeding: 
(a) to which he is a party, or in which he is interested; 
(b) when he is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the 
third degree, computed according to the rules of the common law; or 
(c) when he has been attorney or counsel for either party in the action or 
proceeding. 
(2) The provisions of this section do not apply to the arrangement of the calendar 
or the regulation of the order of business, nor to the power of transferring the 
action or proceeding to some other court. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 312, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
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Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure 
Rule 22. Initial appearance and preliminary examination in cases under 
Section 78A-6-702 and Section 78A-6-703. 
(a) When a smnmons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the minor shall 
appear before the court as directed in the summons. 
(b) When any peace officer or other person makes an arrest of a minor without a 
warrant, the minor shall be taken to a detention center pending a detention 
hearing, which shall be held as provided by these rules. When any peace officer 
makes an arrest of a minor with a warrant, the minor shall be taken to the place 
designated on the warrant. If an information has not been filed, one shall be filed 
without delay in the court with jurisdiction over the offense. 
(c) If a minor is arrested in a county other than '"'here the offense was committed 
the minor shall without unnecessary delay be returned to the county where the 
crime was committed and shall be taken before a judge of the juvenile court. 
( d) The court shall, upon the minor's first appearance, inform the minor: 
(d)(1) of the charge in the information or indictment and furnish the 1ninor 
with a copy; 
( d)(2) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the 
information and how to obtain them; 
(d)(3) of the right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court 
without expense if the minor is unable to obtain counsel; 
( d)(4) of rights concerning detention, pretrial release, and bail in the event the 
minor is bound over to stand trial in district court; and 
(d)(S) that the minor is not required to make any staten1ent, and that any 
statements made may be used against the minor in a court of law. 
(e) The court shall, after providing the information under paragraph (d) and 
before proceeding further, allow the minor reasonable time and opportunity to 
consult counsel and shall allow the minor to contact any attorney by any 
reasonable means, vvithout delay and \Vithoul fee. 
(f)("1) The mjnor may not be called on to enter a plea. During the initial 
appear::nce, the minor shall be advised of the right to a preliminary cxmnina tion 
and, as applicable, to a certification hearing pursuant to Section ?SA-6-703 or to 
the right to present evidence regarding the conditions established by Section 
?SA-6-702. If the minor waives the right to a preliminary examination and, if 
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applicable, a certification hearing, and if the prosecuting attorney consents, the 
court shall order the minor bound over to answer in the district court. 
(f)(2) If the minor does not waive a preliminary examination, the court shall 
schedule the preliminary examination. The thne periods of this rule may be 
extended by the court for good cause shown. The preliminary examination 
shall be held within a reasonable time, but not later than ten days after the 
initial appearance if the minor is in custody for the offense charged and the 
information is filed under Section 78A-6-702. The preliminary examination 
shall be held within a reasonable time, but not later than 30 days after the 
initial appearance if: 
(f)(2)(A) the minor is in custody for the offense charged and the 
information is filed under Section78A-6-703; or 
(f)(2)(B) the minor is not in custody. 
(f)(3) A preliminary examination may not be held if the minor is indicted. If 
the indictment is filed under 78A-6-703, the court shall proceed in accordance 
with Rule 23 to hear evidence presented by the prosecutor regarding the 
factors of Section 78A-6-703 for waiver of jurisdiction and certification, unless 
the hearing is waived. If the indictment is filed under Section 78A-6-702, the 
court shall proceed in accordance with Rule 23A to hear evidence presented 
by the minor regarding the conditions of Section 78A-6-702, if requested. 
(g) A preliminary examination shall be held under the rules and laws applicable 
to criminal cases tried before a court. The state has the burden of proof and shall 
proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the state's case, the minor may 
testify under oath, call witnesses, and present evidence. The 1ninor may cross-
examine adverse witnesses. 
(h) If from the evidence the court finds probable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been committed and that the minor has cmnmitted it, and if the 
information is filed under Section 78A-6-703, the court shall proceed in 
accordance with Rule 23 to hear evidence presented by the prosecutor regarding 
the factors of Section 78A-6-703 for ·vvaiver of jurisdiction and certification. 
(i) If from the evidence the court finds probable cause to believe that the crilne 
charged has been c01nmitted and that tbe minor has comn1itted it, and if the 
in.formation is filed under Section78A-6-702, the court shali proceed in 
accordance with Rule 23A to hear evidence presented by the minor regarding the 
conditions of Section 78A-6-702. 
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G) The finding of probable cause may be based on hearsay in whole or in part. 
Objections to evidence on the ground that it was acquired by unlawful means are 
not properly raised at the preliminary examination. 
(k) If the court does not find probable cause to believe that the crime charged has 
been committed or that the minor com1nitted it, the court shall dismiss the 
information and discharge the minor. The court may enter findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The dismissal and discharge do 
not preclude the state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same 
offense. 
(1) At a preliminary examination, upon request of either party, and subject to 
Title 77, Chapter 38, Victim Rights, the court may: 
(1)(1) exclude witnesses from the courtroom; 
(1)(2) require witnesses not to converse with each other until the preliminary 
examination is concluded; and 
(1)(3) exclude spectators from the courtroom. 
Rule 23A. Hearing on conditions of Section 78A-6-702; bind over to district 
l,:j) court. 
(a) If a criminal indictment under Section 78A-6-702 alleges the commission of a 
felony, the court shall, upon the request of the minor, hear evidence and consider 
the conditions in paragraph (c). 
~ (b) If a crhninal infonnation under Section 78A-6-702 alleges the con1111ission of a 
felony, after a finding of probable cause in accordance with Rule 22, the court 
shall hear evidence and determine whether the conditions of paragraph (c) exist. 
(c) The minor shall have the burden of going forward and presenting evidence of 
vj the following conditions as provided in Section 78A-6-702: 
(c)(1) the 1ninor has not been previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense 
involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if 
L~a,~1r11itted hu :-1i, ;.->dnlt·· ... 1 , , ~ l J c.. , -l ~- _, A ~ 1 
(c)(2) that if the offense ,vas committed vvjth one or more other persons, the 
rninor appear5 to have 2 lesser degree of culpability than the codefcnd ants,: 
(c)(3) that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a violent, 
aggressive, or premeditated manner; 
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(c)(4) the number and nature of the minor's prior adjudications in the juvenile 
court; and 
(c)(S) that public safety is better served by adjudicating the minor in the 
juvenile court or in the district court. 
( d) At the conclusion of the minor's case, the state may call witnesses and present 
evidence on the conditions required by Section 78A-6-702. The minor may cross-
examine adverse witnesses. 
(e) If the court does not find by clear and convincing evidence that it would be 
conh·ary to the best interest of the minor and the best interests of the public to 
bind the minor over to the jurisdiction of the district court, the court shall enter 
an order directing the 1ninor to answer the charges in district court. 
(£)(1) Upon entry of an order directing the minor to answer the charges in district 
court, the court shall comply with the requirements of Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail. 
By issuance of a warrant of arrest or continuance of an existing warrant, the court 
may order the minor c01n1nitted to jail in accordance with Section 62A-7-201. The 
court shall enter the appropriate written order. 
(f)(2) Once the 1ninor is bound over to district court, a determination 
regarding where the minor is held shall be made pursuant to Section 78A-6-
702. 
(f)(3) The clerk of the juvenile court shall transmit to the clerk of the dish-ict 
court all pleadings in and records made of the proceedings in the juvenile 
court. 
(f)(4) The jurisdiction of the court shall terminate as provided by statute. 
(g) If the court finds probable cause to believe that a felony has been com1nitted 
and that the minor comn1itted it and also finds that all of the conditions of 
Section 78A-6-702 are present, the court shall proceed upon the information as if 
it were a petition. The court may order the minor held in a detention center or 
released in accordance with Rule 9. 
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Utah Code of Judicial Conduct 
RULE 2.11. Disqualification 
(A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the 
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to 
the following circumstances: 
~ (1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's 
lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding. 
(2) The judge knows that the judge, the judge's spouse or domestic partner, or 
a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the 
~ spouse or domestic parb1er of such a person is: 
(a) a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, general partner, 
managing member, or trustee of a party; 
(b) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
(c) a person who has more than a de minimis interest that could be 
substantially affected by the proceeding; or 
(d) likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. 
(3) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the 
judge's spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child, or any other member of the 
judge's family residing in the judge's household, has an economic interest in 
the subject matter in conh·oversy or in a party to the proceeding. 
(4) The judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that a party, a 
party's lawyer, or the law firm of a party's lawyer has within the previous 
three years made aggregate contributions to the judge's retention in an 
amount that is greater than $50. 
(5) The judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate, has made a public 
statement, other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that 
comrnHs or appears to commit the judge to reach a particular result or rule in 
a particular way in the proceeding or controversy. 
(6) The judge: 
(a) served as a la,vyer in the matter in controversy, or ,vas associated with 
a lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the ma tier during 
such association; 
(b) served in governmental employni.ent, and in such capacity participated 
personally and substantially as a lavvyer or public official concerning the 
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proceeding, or has publicly expressed in such capacity an opinion 
concerning the merits of the particular matter in controversy; 
(c) was a material witness concerning the matter; or 
( d) previously presided as a judge over the matter in another court and is 
now acting as a judge who would hear the appeal or trial de nova. 
(B) A judge shall keep informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary 
economic interests, and make a reasonable effort to keep informed about the 
personal economic interests of the judge's spouse or domestic partner and minor 
children residing in the judge's household. 
(C) A trial court judge subject to disqualification under this Rule, other than for 
bias or prejudice under paragraph (A)(l), may disclose on the record the basis of 
the judge's disqualification and may ask the parties and their lawyers to 
consider, outside the presence of the judge and court personnel, whether to 
waive disqualification. If, following the disclosure, the parties and lawyers agree, 
without participation by the judge or court personnel, that the judge should not 
be disqualified, the judge may participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall 
be incorporated into the record of the proceeding. 
(D) An appellate court judge or justice subject to disqualification under this Rule, 
other than for bias or prejudice under paragraph (A)(l), may send notice to the 
parties disclosing the basis for the judge or justice's disqualification and asking 
them to consider whether to waive disqualification. With respect to paragraphs 
(A)(2) or (A)(3), the judge or justice may participate in the decision of the case if 
all parties, other than the party presumably benefitted by the apparent bias 
constituting the disqualifying circumstance, waive the disqualification. With 
respect to paragraphs (A)(4) through (A)(6), the judge or justice may participate 
in the decision of the case if all parties waive the disqualification. The responses 
to a notice of a disqualifying circumstance shall be included in the appellate file 
pertaining to the proceeding. 
COMMENT 
[1 l Under this Rule, a judge is disqualified whenever the judge's jmpartiality 
n1ight reasonably be questioned, regardless of whether any of the specific 
provisions of paragraphs (A)(l) through (6) apply. 
[2] A judge's obligation not to hear or decide n1atters in which disqualification is 
required applies regardless of whether a 111.otion to disqualify is filed. 
[3] The rule of necessity may override the rule of disqualification. For example, a 
judge might be required to participate in judicial review of a judicial salary 
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statute, or might be the only judge available in a matter requiring immediate 
judicial action, such as a hearing on probable cause or a temporary restraining 
order. In matters that require immediate action, the judge must disclose on the 
record the basis for possible disqualification and make reasonable efforts to 
h·ansfer the matter to another judge as soon as practicable. 
[4] A judge is disqualified in proceedings involving a law firm that e1nploys the 
judge's spouse, dmnestic partner, parent, or child, or any other member of the 
judge's family residing in the judge's household as an equity holder in the law 
firm. A judge·is not disqualified in other situations unless the judge's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned under paragraph (A), or a relative is 
known by the judge to have an interest in the law firm that could be substantially 
affected by the proceeding under paragraph (A)(2)(c). 
[5] A judge should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the 
parties or their lawyers might reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion 
for disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no basis for 
disqualification. 
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7 LONG TITLE 
8 General Description: 
2013 GENERAL SESSION 
STATE OF UTAH 
Chief Sponsor: V. Lowry Snow 
Senate Sponsor: Lyle W. Hillyard 
H.B. 105 
9 This bill amends the procedure to transfer jurisdiction for a serious youth offender from 
IO a juvenile court to a district court. 
11 Highlighted Provisions: 
12 This bill: 
13 • provides for a juvenile court judge to consider a minor's prior adjudications in 
14 juvenile court. a minor's best interest, and the public's safety when determining a 
15 jurisdiction transfer from a juvenile court to a district court; and 
16 • makes technical changes. 
17 Money Appropriated in this Bill: 
18 None 
19 Other Special Clauses: 
20 None 
11 Utah Code Sections Affected: 
22 AMENDS: 
2.1 
,._- r ·- ... 
t~ 1 L 1 1u/,. 
26 
27 
Section I. Section 78A-6-702 is amended to read: 
7SA-6-702. Serious }'oulh offender -- Procedure. 
28 
29 
( 1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general charging 
a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by criminal information and filed in the 
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30 juvenile court if the information charges any of the following offenses: 










(i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson; 
(ii) Section 76-5-103, aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury to another; 
(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated [kidnaping] kidnapping; 
(iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary; 
(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery; 
(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; 
(vii) Section 76- 10-508.1, felony discharge of a firearm; 
(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder; or 
(ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder; or 
41 (b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection (] )(a) involving the use of a 
42 dangerous weaponi which would be a felony if committed by an adult, and the minor has been 
43 previously adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous weaponi 
44 which also would have been a felony if committed by an adult. 
45 (2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under Subsection 
46 (I) shall be conducted in conformity with the rules established by the Utah Supreme Court. 
47 (3) (a) If the information al1eges the violation of a felony listed in Subsection (I), the 
48 state shall have the burden of going forward with its case and the burden of proof to establish 
49 probable cause to believe that one of the crimes listed in Subsection ( 1) has been committed 
50 and that the defendant committed it. If proceeding under Subsection ( 1 )(b ), the state sha11 have 
51 the additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has 
52 previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous 
53 weapon. 
54 (b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under this Subsection 
5:S (3 ). the court shall order that the def enclant be bound over and held to answer in the district 
56 court in the same manner as an adult unless the juvenile court judge finds that [nll of the 
57 +vi lowing co11ditio11s c.-.i.~t.] it would be contrarv to the best interest of the minor and to the 
- 2 -
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58 public to bind over the defendant to the jurisdiction of the district court. 
~ 59 (c) In making the bind over determination in Subsection (3)(b). the judge shall consider 
60 only the following: 
61 (i) whether the minor has [not] been previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense 
62 involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an adult; 
63 (ii) [that] if the offense was committed with one or more other persons, whether the 
64 minor appears to have a greater or lesser degree of culpability than the codefendants; [and] 
65 (iii) [that] the extent to which the minor's role in the offense was [not] committed in a 
~ 66 violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner[:t 
67 (iv) the number and nature of the minor's prior adjudications in the juvenile court; and 
68 (v) whether public safetv is better served bv adjudicating the minor in the juvenile 
69 court or in the district court. 
70 [ftj) .(Ql Once the state has met its burden under [this] Subsection (3)W as to a 
71 showing of probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going forward and 
72 presenting evidence [ as to the existence of the above conditions] that in light of the 
73 considerations listed in Subsection (3)(c). it would be contrary to the best interest of the minor 
74 and the best interests of the public to bind the defendant over to the jurisdiction of the district 
75 court. 
76 [fd-J] W If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that [alt-the 
<$ 77 above ccmditions me satisfied,] it would be contrary to the best interest of the minor and the 
78 best interests of the public to bind the defendant over to the jurisdiction of the district court. the 
79 court shall so state in its findings and order the minor held for trial as a minor and shall proceed 
80 upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition. 
81 ( 4) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but that the 
82 state has not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to bind the defendant over 
83 under Subsection ( 1 ), the juvenile court judge shall order the defendant held for trial as a minor 
(j 84 and shall proceed upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition. 
85 ( 5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of arrest shall issue. 
- 3 -
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86 The defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be 
87 advised of that right by the juvenile court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in 
88 accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail. 
89 (6) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under this section, 
90 the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need not include a finding of 
91 probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment was committed and that the defendant 
92 committed it, but the juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the 
93 additional considerations listed in Subsection (3)(b). 
94 (7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same 
95 information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for one or more 
96 charges under this section, other offenses arising from the same criminal episode and any 
97 subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against him shall be considered together with 
98 those charges, and where the court finds probable cause to believe that those crimes have been 
99 committed and that the defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound over to 
100 the district court to answer for those charges. 
101 (8) When a minor has been bound over to the district court under this section, the 
102 jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and the juvenile court over the minor is 
103 terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the same criminal episode, 
104 and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against the minor, except as provided in 
I 05 Subsection ( I 2). 
106 (9) A minor who is bound over to answer as an adult in the district court under this 
107 section or on whom an indictment has been returned by a grand jury is not entitled to a 
I 08 preliminary examination in the district court. 
109 ( 10) Allegations contained in the indictment or information that the defendant has 
110 previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous 
I I I weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of the criminal offense and do not need 
112 to be proven at trial in the district court. 
113 ( I I) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty oL any of the charges filed or any 
- 4 -
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114 other offense arising from the same criminal episode, the district court retains jurisdiction over 
4' 115 the minor for all purposes, including sentencing. 
116 (12) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-l 03 and the Division of Juvenile Justice 
117 Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the minor when there 
118 is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all charges in the district court. 
- 5 -
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8 General Description: 
JUVENILE OFFENDER AMENDMENTS 
2015 GENERAL SESSION 
STATE OF UTAH 
Chief Sponsor: Aaron Osmond 
House Sponsor: V. Lowry Snow 
9 This bill makes changes to statutes regarding minors and courts. 
IO Highlighted Provisions: 
11 This bill: 
S.B. 167 
12 • adds a specific list of previous offenses and conditions to the statute that allows for 
w 13 the direct filing of charges in district court; 
14 • adds a new option to the serious youth offender statute; 
15 • creates guidelines for housing a minor convicted in district court in a juvenile secure 
16 facility; 
17 • requires that the court detem,ine that a minor is knowingly and intentionally 
18 waiving counsel: and 
19 • sets a presumption that juveniles are not to be shackled when appearing in court 
20 unless ordered by the court. 
21 Money Appropriated in this Bill: 
22 None 






This bill provides a spcciai effective date. 
AMENDS: 
62 :\-7-2H l, as last amended by Laws of Utah 20 I 0, Chapter 38 
?li.\-(1-70 L as last amended by Laws of Utah 2014, Chapter 234 
1 8.\-(J-702, as last amended hy Laws of Utah 2014, Chapter 234 
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30 78A-6-703, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2014, Chapter 234 
31 78.-\-6-1111, as repealed and reenacted by Laws of Utah 2014, Chapter 275 
32 ENACTS: 
33 78A-6- I 22, Utah Code Annotated 1953 
34 78A-6-705, Utah Code Annotated 1953 
35 
36 Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
37 Section 1. Section 62A-7-201 is amended to read: 
38 62A-7-201. Confinement -- Facilities -- Restrictions. 
39 (I) Children under 18 years of age, who are apprehended by any officer or brought 
40 before any court for examination under any provision of state law, may not be confined in jails, 
41 lockups, or cells used for persons 18 years of age or older who are charged with crime, or in 
42 secure postadjudication correctional facilities operated by the division, except as provided in 
43 Subsection (2), other specific statute, or in conformance with standards approved by the board. 
44 (2) (a) Children charged with crimes under Section 78A-6-701, as a serious youth 
45 offender under Section nA-6-702 and bound over to the jurisdiction of the district court, or 
46 certified to stand trial as an adult pursuant to Section 78A-(>- 703, if detained, shall be detained 
47 [;11 c1jail 01 othc1 place ofdcte11ti011 used fo1 adults] as provided in these sections. 
48 (b) Children detained in adult facilities under Section 78/\-6-702 or 78/\-6- 703 prior to 
49 a hearing before a magistrate, or under Subsection 78A-(l- I l 3(3), may only be held in certified 
50 juvenile detention accommodations in accordance with rules promulgated by the division. 
51 Those rules shall include standards for acceptable sight and sound separation from adult 
52 inmates. The division certifies facilities that are in compliance with the division's standards. 
53 The provisions of this Subsection (2)(h) do not apply to juveniles held in an adult detention 
54 facility in accordance with Subsection (2)(a). 
55 (3) In areas of low density population. the division may, by rule, approve juvenile 
56 holding accommodations within adult facil!ties that han' acceptable sight and sound 
::.,7 separation Those focilitie~ shall he used only for short-term holding purpose~. with a 
- 2 -
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58 maximum confinement of six hours, for children alleged to have committed an act which 
~ 59 would be a criminal offense if committed by an adult. Acceptable short-tenn holding purposes 
60 are: identification, notification of juvenile court officials, processing, and allowance of 
61 adequate time for evaluation of needs and circumstances regarding release or transfer to a 
62 shelter or detention facility. The provisions of this Subsection (3) do not apply to juveniles 
63 held in an adult detention facility in accordance with Subsection (2)(a). 
64 (4) Children who are alleged to have committed an act which would be a criminal 
65 offense if committed by an adult, may be detained in holding rooms in local law enforcement 
vP 66 agency facilities for a maximum of two hours, for identification or interrogation, or while 
67 awaiting release to a parent or other responsible adult. Those rooms shall be ce1tified by the 
68 division~ according to the division's mles. Those mles shall include provisions for constant 
69 supervision and for sight and sound separation from adult inmates. 
70 (5) Willful failure to comply with any of the provisions of this section is a class B 
71 misdemeanor. 
72 (6) (a) The division is responsible for the custody and detention of children under 18 
73 years of age who require detention care prior to trial or examination, or while awaiting 
74 assignment to a home or facility, as a dispositional placement under Subsection 
75 78A-6-- I l 7(2)(f)(i) or 78A-6- I l O I (3)(a), and of youth offenders under Subsection 
76 6~_,\- 7-504(8). The provisions of this Subsection (6)(a) do not apply to juveniles held in an 
~ 77 adult detention facility in accordance with Subsection (2)(a). 
78 (b) The division shall provide standards for custody or detention under Subsections 
79 (2)(b), (3), and (4), and shall determine and set standards for conditions of care and 




( c) All other custody or detention shall be provided by the division, or by contract with 
a public or private agency willing to undertake temporary custody or detention upon agreed 
terms, or in suitable premises distinct and separate from the general jails, lockups, or cells used 
(jj 84 in law enforcement and corrections systems. The provisions of this Subsection (6)(c) do not 
85 apply to _juveniles held in an adult detention facility in accordance with Subsection (2)(a) . 
..., 
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Section 2. Section 78A-6-122 is enacted to read: 




88 (1) As used in this section, "restrained" means the use of handcuffs, chains, shackles, 
89 zip ties, irons. straightjackets. and any other device or method which may be used to 
90 immobilize a juvenile. 
91 (2) The Judicial Council shall adopt rules that address the circumstances under which a 
92 juvenile may be restrained while appearing in court. The Judicial Council shall ensure that the 
93 rules consider both the welfare of the juvenile and the safety of the court. A juvenile may not 
94 be restrained during a court proceeding unless restraint is authorized by rules of the Judicial 
95 Council. 
96 Section 3. Section 78A-6-701 is amended to read: 
97 78A-6-701. Jurisdiction of district court. 
98 ( 1) The district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over all persons 16 years of age 
99 or older charged with: 
100 (a) an offense which would be murder or aggravated murder if committed by an adult; 
101 [or] 
102 (b) [an offense which wottld be a felony if committed by an adult] if the minor has 
I 03 been previously committed to a secure facility as defined in Section 62A-7-10 l [:-rhi-s 
I 04 Subsection (l )(b) shall not apply if the offense is committed in a seem e facility. J, a felony 
105 violation of: 
l 06 (i) Section 76-(l- I 0.1, aggravated arson: 






l l 3 
(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnapping; 
(iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary: 
(v) Section 7()-<l-302, aggravated robbery~ 
(vi) Section -✓-(:--~~,---!OS. aggravated sexual assault; 
(vii) Section ··:(,. l (l .. ~rn~. i_, felony discharge of a firearm; 
(viii) Section :·1,><~ 1\L attempted aggravated murder: or 
- 4 -
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114 (ix) Section 76-5-203. attempted murder: or 
~ 115 ( c) an offense other than those listed in Subsection ( 1 )(b) involving the use of a 
l 16 dangerous weapon, which would be a felony if committed by an adult. and the minor has been 
117 previously adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon, 
118 which also would have been a felony if committed by an adult. 
119 (2) When the district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a minor under this 
120 section, it also has exclusive original jurisdiction over the minor regarding all offenses joined 
121 with the qualifying offense, and any other offenses, including misdemeanors, arising from the 
122 same criminal episode. The district court is not divested of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact 
123 that the minor is allowed to enter a plea to, or is found guilty of, a lesser or joined offense. 
124 (3) (a) Any felony, misdemeanor, or infraction committed after the offense over which 
125 the district court takes jurisdiction under Subsection ( 1) or (2) shall be tried against the 
126 defendant as an adult in the district court or justice court havingjurisdiction. 
127 (b) If the qualifying charge under Subsection (1) results in an acquittal, a finding of not 
128 guilty, or a dismissal of the charge in the district court, the juvenile court under Section 
129 78A-6- l 03 and the Division of Juvenile Justice Services regain any jurisdiction and authority 
130 previously exercised over the minor. 
131 ( 4) A minor anested under this section shall be held in a juvenile detention facility 
132 until the district court detennines where the minor shall be held until the time of trial, except 
133 for defendants who arc otherwise subject to the authority of the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
134 (5) The district court shall consider the following when determining where the minor 
135 will be held until the time of trial: 




(b) the nature~ seriousness. and circumstances of the alleged offense: 
( c) the minor's history of prior criminal acts; 
( d) whether detention in a juvenile detention facility will adequately serve the need for 
~ 140 community protection pending the outcome of any criminal proceedings; 
141 (e) ,:vhcther the minor's placement in a _juvenile detention faciiity wili negatively impact 
- 5 -
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142 the functioning of the facility by compromising the goals of the facility to maintain a safe, 
143 positive, and secure environment for all minors within the facility; 
144 (f) the relative ability of the facility to meet the needs of the minor and protect the 
145 public; 




(h) the physical maturity of the minor; 
(i) the cunent mental state of the minor as evidenced by relevant mental health or 
150 psychological assessments or screenings that are made available to the court; and 
151 U) any other factors the court considers relevant. 
152 (6) A minor ordered to a juvenile detention facility under Subsection (5) shall remain 
153 in the facility until released by a district court judge, or if convicted, until sentencing. 
154 (7) A minor held in a juvenile detention facility under this section shall have the same 
155 right to bail as any other criminal defendant. 
156 (8) If the minor ordered to a juvenile detention facility under Subsection (5) attains the 
157 age of 18 years, the minor shall be transferred within 30 days to an adult jail until released by 
158 the district court judge, or if convicted, until sentencing. 
159 (9) A minor 16 years of age or older whose conduct or condition endangers the safety 
160 or welfare of others in the juvenile detention facility may, by court order that specifies the 
161 reasons, be detained in another place of confinement considered appropriate by the court, 
162 including jail or other place of pretrial confinement for adults. 
163 Section 4. Section 78A-6-702 is amended to read: 
164 78A-6-702. Serious youth offender -- Procedure. 
165 (I) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general charging 
166 a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony [smrlt] may be by criminal infomrntion and filed 
167 in the juvenile court if the minor was a principal actor in the offense and the information 
168 
169 
charges any of the follmving offenses: 
(a) any felony violation of: 
- 6 -
t:t\ lill!!il 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Enrolled Copy S.B. 167 
(i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson; 170 
171 
172 
(ii) Section 76-5-103, aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury to another; 






(iv) Section 7(>-(>-203, aggravated burglary; 
(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery; 
(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; 
(vii) Section 76-10-508.1, felony discharge of a firearm; 
(viii) Section 76-5<W2, attempted aggravated murder; or 
178 (ix) Section 76-5-~03, attempted murder; or 
179 (b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection ( 1 )(a) involving the use of a 
180 dangerous weapon, which would be a felony if committed by an adult, and the minor has been 
181 previously adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon, 
182 which also would have been a felony if committed by an adult. 
183 (2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under Subsection 
184 ( 1) shall be conducted in conformity with the rules established by the Utah Supreme Court. 
185 (3) (a) If the information alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsection (1 ), the 
186 state shall have the burden of going forward with its case and the burden of proof to establish 
187 probable cause to believe that one of the crimes listed in Subsection (1) has been committed 
188 and that the defendant committed it. If proceeding under Subsection ( 1 )(b ), the state shall have 
189 the additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has 
I 90 previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous 
191 weapon. 
192 (b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under this Subsection 
193 (3 ), the court shall order that the defendant be bound over and held to answer in the district 
194 court in the same manner as an adult unless the juvenile court judge finds that it would be 
195 contrary to the best interest of the minor and to the public to bind over the defendant to the 
(ii) 196 jurisdiction of the district court. 
197 ( c) In making the bind over dete1111ination in Subsection (3 )(b). the judge shall consider 
- 7 -
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198 only the following: 
199 (i) whether the minor has been previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense 
200 involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an adult; 
20 I (ii) if the offense was committed with one or more other persons, whether the minor 
202 appears to have a greater or lesser degree of culpability than the codefendants; 
203 (iii) the extent to which the minor's role in the offense was committed in a violent, 
204 aggressive, or premeditated manner; 
205 (iv) the number and nature of the minor's prior adjudications in the juvenile court; and 
206 (v) whether public safety [is] and the interests of the minor are better served by 
207 adjudicating the minor in the juvenile court or in the district court, including whether the 
208 resources of the adult svstem or juvenile system are more likely to assist in rehabilitating the 
209 minor and reducing the threat which the minor presents to the public. 
210 (d) Once the state has met its burden under Subsection (3)(a) as to a showing of 
211 probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going forward and presenting evidence 
212 that in light of the considerations listed in Subsection (3 )( c ), it would be contrary to the best 
213 interest of the minor and the best interests of the public to bind the defendant over to the 
214 jurisdiction of the district court. 
215 ( e) If the juvenile court judge finds by [ cleat and com iuci11g] a preponderance of 
216 evidence that it would be contrary to the best interest of the minor and the best interests of the 
217 public to bind the defendant over to the jurisdiction of the district court, the court shall so state 
218 in its findings and order the minor held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the 
219 information as though it were a juvenile petition. 
220 ( 4) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but that the 
221 state has not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to bind the defendant over 
222 under Subsection ( 1 ), the juvenile court judge shall order the defendant held for trial as a minor 
223 and shall proceed upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition. 
224 (5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of anest shall issue. 
225 The defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be 
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226 advised of that right by the juvenile court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in 
227 accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail. 
228 (6) At the time the minor is bound over to the district court, the juvenile court shall 
229 make the initial deten11ination on where the minor shall be held. 
230 (7) The juvenile court shall consider the following when determining where the minor 
23 I shall be held until the time of trial: 




(b) the nature, seriousness, and circumstances of the alleged offense; 
( c) the minor's history of prior criminal acts; 
(d) whether detention in a juvenile detention facility will adequately serve the need for 
236 community protection pending the outcome of any criminal proceedings; 
23 7 ( e) whether the minor's placement in a juvenile detention facility will negatively impact 
23 8 the functioning of the facility by compromising the goals of the facility to maintain a safe, 
239 positive, and secure environment for all minors within the facility; 
240 (f) the relative ability of the facility to meet the needs of the minor and protect the 
241 public; 
242 (g) whether the minor presents an imminent risk of hann to the minor or others within 
243 the facility; 
244 (h) the physical maturity of the minor; 
245 (i) the cuITent mental state of the minor as evidenced by relevant mental health or 
246 psychological assessments or screenings that are made available to the comt; and 
24 7 U) any other factors the court considers relevant. 
248 (8) If a minor is ordered to a juvenile detention facility under Subsection (7), the minor 
249 shall remain in the facility until released by a district court judge, or if convicted~ until 
250 sentencing. 
251 (9) A minor held in a juvenile detention facility under this section shall have the same 
@ 252 right to bail as any other criminal defendant. 
253 ( l 0) Jf the minor ordered to a juveniie detention facility under Subsection (7) attains 
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254 the age of 18 years, the minor shall be transfen-ed within 30 days to an adult jail until released 
255 by the district court judge, or if convicted, until sentencing. 
256 (11) A minor I 6 years of age or older whose conduct or condition endangers the safety 
257 or welfare of others in the juvenile detention facility may, by com1 order that specifies the 
258 reasons, be detained in another place of pretrial confinement considered appropriate by the 
259 court, including jail or other place of confinement for adults. 
260 ( 12) The district court may reconsider the decision on where the minor will be held 
261 pursuant to Subsection (6). 
262 ( 13) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under this section, 
263 the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need not include a finding of 
264 probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment was committed and that the defendant 
265 committed it, but the juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the 
266 additional considerations listed in Subsection (3 )(b ). 
267 (14) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same 
268 information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for one or more 
269 charges under this section, other offenses arising from the same criminal episode and any 
270 subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against him shall be considered together with 
271 those charges, and where the com1 finds probable cause to believe that those crimes have been 
272 committed and that the defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound over to 
273 the district court to answer for those charges. 
274 ( 15) When a minor has been bound over to the district court under this section, the 
275 jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and the juvenile court over the minor is 
276 terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the same criminal episode, 
277 and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against the minor~ except as provided in 
278 Subsection ( 19) or Section -;'~:.,\-()- 705. 
279 ( 16) A minor \Vho is bound over to answer as an adult in the district court under this 
280 section or on \Vhorn an indictment has been returned by a grand jury is not entitled to a 
281 nrcliminar~, examination in the district court. 
- 10 -
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282 (] 7) Allegations contained in the indictment or infomrntion that the defendant has 
va 283 previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous 
284 weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of the criminal offense and do not need 
285 to be proven at trial in the district court. 
286 ( 18) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of, any of the charges filed or any 
287 other offense arising from the same criminal episode, the district court retains jurisdiction over 
288 the minor for all purposes, including sentencing. 
289 (19) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice 
290 Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the minor when there 
291 is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all charges in the district court. 
292 Section 5. Section 78A-6-703 is amended to read: 
293 78A-6-703. Certification hearings -- Juvenile court to hold preliminary hearing --
294 Factors considered by juvenile court for waiver of jurisdiction to district court. 
295 (1) If a criminal information filed in accordance with Subsection 78A-6-602(3) alleges 
296 the commission of an act which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, the 
297 juvenile court shall conduct a preliminary hearing. 
298 (2) At the preliminary hearing the state shall have the burden of going forward with its 




(a) probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the defendant 
committed it; and 
(b) by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would be contrary to the best interests of 
303 the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction. 
304 (3) ln considering whether or not it would be contrary to the best interests of the minor 
305 or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction, the juvenile court shall consider, 
306 and may base its decision on, the finding of one or more of the following factors: 
307 (a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the community requires 
308 isolation of the minor beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities; 
309 (b) whether the alleged offense was committed hy the minor under circumstances 
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310 which would subject the minor to enhanced penalties under Section 76-3-203. I if the minor 
311 were adult and the offense was committed: 
312 (i) in concert with two or more persons; 
313 (ii) for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang 
314 as defined in Section 76-9-802; or 
315 (iii) to gain recognition, acceptance, membership, or increased status with a criminal 
316 street gang as defined in Section 76-9-802; 
317 (c) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, 
3 I 8 or willful manner; 
319 ( d) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater weight being 
320 given to offenses against persons, except as provided in Section 76-8-418; 
321 (e) the maturity of the minor as detem1ined by considerations of the minor's home, 
322 environment, emotional attitude, and pattern of living; 
323 (t) the record and previous history of the minor; 
324 (g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use of facilities available to the 
325 juvenile court; 
326 (h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the 





(i) ,:vhether the minor used a firearm in the commission of an offense; and 
U) whether the minor possessed a dangerous weapon on or about school premises as 
331 provided in Section 76-10-505 .5. 
332 ( 4) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in Subsection (3) is 
333 discretionary with the court. 
334 (5) (a) Written reports and other materials relating to the minor's mental, physical, 
335 educational, and social history may be considered by the court. 
336 (b) If requested by the minor, the minor's parent, guardian, or other interested party, the 
337 court shall require the person or agency preparing the report and other material to appear and 
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338 be subject to both direct and cross-examination. 
~ 339 (6) At the conclusion of the state's case, the minor may testify under oath, call 
340 witnesses, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and present evidence on the factors required by 
341 Subsection (3). 
342 (7) At the time the minor is bound over to the district court, the juvenile court shall 
343 make the initial determination on where the minor shall be held. 
344 (8) The juvenile court shall consider the following when determining where the minor 
345 will be held until the time of trial: 




(b) the nature, seriousness, and circumstances of the alleged offense; 
( c) the minoes history of prior criminal acts; 
( d) whether detention in a juvenile detention facility will adequately serve the need for 
~ 350 community protection pending the outcome of any criminal proceedings; 
351 ( e) whether the minor's placement in a juvenile detention facility will negatively impact 
352 the functioning of the facility by compromising the goals of the facility to maintain a safe, 
353 positive, and secure environment for all minors within the facility; 
354 (t) the relative ability of the facility to meet the needs of the minor and protect the 
355 public; 
356 (g) whether the minor presents an imminent risk of hann to the minor or others within 
357 the facility; 
358 (h) the physical maturity of the minor; 
359 (i) the cun-ent mental state of the minor as evidenced by relevant mental health or 
360 psychological assessments or screenings that are made available to the court; and 
361 (i) any other factors the court considers relevant. 
362 (9) If a minor is ordered to a juvenile detention facility under Subsection (8), the minor 
363 shall remain in the facility until released by a district court judge, or if convicted~ until 
364 sentencing. 
365 ( 10) A minor held in a juvenile detention facility under this section shall have the same 
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366 right to bail as any other criminal defendant. 
367 ( 11) If the minor ordered to a juvenile detention facility under Subsection (8) attains 
368 the age of 18 years, the minor shall be transferred within 30 days to an adult jail until released 
369 by the district court judge, or if convicted, until sentencing. 
3 70 (12) A minor 16 years of age or older whose conduct or condition endangers the safety 
371 or welfare of others in the juvenile detention facility may, by com1 order that specifies the 
3 72 reasons, be detained in another place of confinement considered appropriate by the court, 
3 73 including jail or other place of confinement for adults. 
374 (13) The district court may reconsider the decision on where the minor shall be held 
375 pursuant to Subsection (7). 
376 (14) If the court finds the state has met its burden under Subsection (2), the court may 
3 77 enter an order: 
378 (a) certifying that finding; and 
3 79 (b) directing that the minor be held for criminal proceedings in the district court. 
380 ( 15) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury, the preliminary examination held by 
381 the juvenile court need not include a finding of probable cause, but the juvenile court shall 
382 proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional consideration referred to in 
383 Subsection (2)(b). 
384 (16) The provisions of Section 78A-6- I l 5, Section 78A-6- l 1 I 1, and other provisions 
385 reiating to proceedings in juvenile cases are applicable to the hearing held under this section to 
386 the extent they are pertinent. 
3 87 ( 17) A minor who has been directed to be held for criminal proceedings in the district 
3 88 court is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the district court. 
3 89 ( 18) A minor who has been certified for trial in the district court shall have the same 
390 right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile 
391 court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordance with Title 77 1 Chapter 20, 
392 Bail. 
393 ( l 9) When a minor has been certified to the district court under this section, the 
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394 jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
vJ 395 court over the minor is tenninated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the 
396 same criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against the 
397 minor, except as provided in Subsection (21) or Section 78A-6- 705. 
398 (20) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of any of the charges filed or on any 
399 other offense arising out of the same criminal episode, the district court retains jurisdiction 
400 over the minor for all purposes, including sentencing. 
401 (21) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6- l03 and the Division of Juvenile Justice 
402 Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the minor when there 
403 is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all charges in the district court. 
404 Section 6. Section 78A-6-705 is enacted to read: 
405 78A-6-705. Youth prison commitment. 
406 ( l) Before sentencing a minor who is under the jurisdiction of the district court under 
407 Section 78A-6-70 I, 78A-6-702. or 78A-6-703, to prison the court shall request a report from 
408 the Division of Juvenile Justice Services regarding the potential risk to other juveniles if the 
409 minor were to be committed to the custody of the division. The division shall submit the 
410 requested report to the court as part of the pre-sentence report or as a separate rep011. 
411 (2) If. after receiving the report described in Subsection (I). the court detem1ines that 
412 
413 
probation is not appropriate and commitment to prison is an appropriate sentence, the court 
shall order the minor committed to prison and the minor shall be provisionally housed in a 
414 secure facility operated bv the Division of Juvenile Justice Services until the minor reaches 18 
415 years of age, unless released earlier from incarceration by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
416 (3) The court may order the minor committed directly to the custody of the Department 
417 of Corrections if the court finds that: 




(b) the minor has previously been committed to a prison for adult offenders: or 
1 c) housing the minor in a secure facility operated bv the Division of Juvenile Justice 
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422 Services would be contrary to the interests of justice. 
423 (4) The Division of Juvenile Justice Services shall adopt procedures by rule, pursuant 
424 to Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. regarding the transfer of a 
425 minor provisionally housed in a division facility under Subsection (2) to the custody of the 
426 Department of Corrections. If. in accordance with those rules, the division detennines that 
427 housing the minor in a division facility presents an umeasonable risk to others or that it is not 
428 in the best interest of the minor, it shall transfer the physical custody of the minor to the 
429 Department of Corrections. 
430 (5) When a minor is committed to prison but ordered by a comt to be housed in a 
431 Division of Juvenile Justice Services facility under this section, the court and the division shall 
432 immediately notify the Board of Pardons and Parole so that the minor may be scheduled for a 
433 hearing according to board procedures. If a minor who is provisionallv housed in a division 
434 facility under this section has not been paroled or otherwise released from incarceration by the 
435 time the minor reaches 18 years of age. the division shall as soon as reasonably possible. but 
436 not later than when the minor reaches 18 years and 6 months of age, transfer the minor to the 
43 7 physical custody of the Department of Corrections. 
438 (6) Upon the commitment of a minor to the custody of the Division of Juvenile Justice 
439 Services or the Department of Corrections under this section. the Board of Pardons and Parole 
440 has authority over the minor for purposes of parole. pardon, commutation, tennination of 
441 
442 
sentence, remission of fines or forfeitures. orders of restitution, and all other purposes 
authorized by law. 
443 (7) The Youth Parole Authority may hold hearings, receive reports, or otherwise keep 
444 infom1ed of the progress of a minor in the custody of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services 





recommendations concerning the minor. 
{8) Commitment of a minor under this section is a prison commitment for all 
sentencing purposes. 
Section 7. Section 78A-6-11 ll is amended to read: 
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450 
451 
78A-6-1111. Right to counsel -- Appointment of counsel for indigent -- Costs. 
(1) (a) In any action in juvenile court initiated by the state, a political subdivision of the 
452 state, or a private party, the parents, legal guardian, and the minor, where applicable, shall be 
453 informed that they may be represented by counsel at every stage of the proceedings. 
454 (b) In any action initiated by a private party, the parents or legal guardian shall have the 
455 right to employ counsel of their own choice at their own expense. 
456 ( c) If, in any action initiated by the state or a political subdivision of the state under 
457 Part 3, Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings; Part 5, Termination of Parental Rights 
458 Act; or Part I 0, Adult Offenses, of this chapter or under Section 78A-6- l l 0 I, a parent or legal 
459 guardian requests an attorney and is found by the court to be indigent, counsel shall be 
460 appointed by the court to represent the parent or legal guardian in all proceedings directly 
461 related to the petition or motion filed by the state, or a political subdivision of the state, subject 
462 to the provisions of this section. 
463 ( d) In any action initiated by the state, a political subdivision of the state, or a private 
464 party under Part 3, Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings, or Part 5, Tem1ination of 
465 Parental Rights Act, of this chapter, the child shall be represented by a guardian ad litem in 
466 accordance with Sections 78A-6-317 and 781\-6-902. The child shall also be represented by an 
467 attorney guardian ad litem in other actions initiated under this chapter when appointed by the 
468 court under Section ·~s:\-6-902 or as otherwise provided by law. 
~ 469 ( e) In any action initiated by the state or a political subdivision of the state under Part 
4 70 6, Delinquency and Criminal Actions. or Part 7, Transfer of .Jurisdiction, of this chapter, or 
4 71 against a minor under Section 7~/\-()- I l (l I~ the parents or legal guardian and the minor shall be 
4 72 informed that the minor [may] has the right to be represented by counsel at every stage of the 
4 73 proceedings [ and that ifl 
474 (i) In cases where a minor is facing a felony level offense, the court shall appoint 
475 counsel. who shall appear until counsel is retained on the minor's behalf. The minor mav not 
476 waive counsel unless the minor has had a meanin2:ful opportunitv to consult with a defense 
4 77 attornev. The court shall make findings nn the record. takin!~_into consideration the minor's 
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4 78 unique circumstances and attributes. that the waiver is lmowing and voluntary and the minor 
479 understands the consequences of waiving the right to counsel. 
480 {ii) In all other situations the right to counsel may not be waived by a minor unless 
481 there has been a finding on the record, taking into consideration the minor's unique 
482 circumstances and attributes, that the waiver is lmowing and voluntary, and the minor 
483 understands the consequences of waiving the right to counsel. 
484 (iii) If the minor is found to be indigent, counsel shall be appointed by the court to 
485 represent the minor in all proceedings directly related to the petition or motion filed by the state 
486 or a political subdivision of the state, subject to the provisions of this section. 
487 (f) lndigency of a parent, legal guardian, or minor shall be determined in accordance 
488 with the process and procedure defined in Section 77-32-'202. The court shall take into account 
489 the income and financial ability of the parent or legal guardian to retain counsel in determining 
490 the indigency of the minor. 
491 (g) The cost of appointed counsel for a party found to be indigent, including the cost of 
492 counsel and expense of the first appeal, shall be paid by the county in which the trial court 
493 proceedings are held. Counties may levy and collect taxes for these purposes. 
494 (2) Counsel appointed by the comi may not provide representation as court-appointed 
495 counsel for a parent or legal guardian in any action initiated by, or in any proceeding to modify 
496 court orders in a proceeding initiated by, a private party. 
497 (3) If the county responsible to provide legal counsel for an indigent under Subsection 
498 ( 1 )(g) has arranged by contract to provide services, the court shall appoint the contracting 
499 attorney as legal counsel to represent that indigent. 
500 ( 4) The court may order a parent or legal guardian for whom counsel is appointed, and 
50 I the parents or legal guardian of any minor for whom counsel is appointed, to reimburse the 
502 county for the cost of appointed counsel. 
503 (5) The state, or an agency of the state, may not be ordered to reimburse the county for 
504 
505 
expenses inctUTed under Subsection ( I )(g). 
Section 8. Effective date. 
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506 Section 78A-6-122 takes effect October I. 2015. 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
I 
I 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
! FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND ORDER ON BIND OVER 
vs. 
COOPER VAN HUIZEN, 
Defendant. 
Case Number: 100344 7 
Judge: Michelle E Heward 
This matter came before the court for a preliminary hearing/examination and a 
subsequent best interest hearing, on December 20, 2013. The State was present and represented 
by Brody E. Flint, Deputy Weber County Attorney. The Defendant was present and represented 
by his attorney, Rex Bray; co-defendant Josh Parley Dutson was present and represented by 
counsel, Mary Ann Ellis. The Court heard evidence from all parties and being fully apprised, 
now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OFF ACT 
1. The State met its burden and the court finds probable cause to believe that the 
crimes listed in the Information, two aggravated robberies and one aggravated burglary, occurred 
as alleged. 
2. Further, there is probable cause to believe that Cooper Van Huizcn committed fr,.:. 
offenses ullegcd in the Information. 
The Dcfendan.t lias 11\) prior record in the juvenile court. 
JAN 2. :1. 211:-'i 
- JUVENILE COURT 
SF:COND JUDICIAL D1Srn 1r:, 
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Page 2 
4. These offenses were committed with other co-defendants. The Court therefore 
considers the Defendant's degree of culpability in comparison to the other co-defendants, and 
finds that his culpability was significant. 
a. Mr. Van Huizen's involvement was less at the scene of the crime than 
others. There is insufficient evidence that he brandished a gun or switchblade knife 
during the commission of the burglary or robberies although he was present and assisted 
in the forced entrance into the home with co-defendants. 
b. Mr. Van Huizen's involvement was to plan and facilitate the robberies. 
Specifically the guns used were guns from Mr. Van Huizen's home. Mr. Van Huizen 
provided the guns knowing they would be used in the burglary and robberies. 
C. Mr. Van Huizen's assistance in the robbery ensured that the other co-
defendants would have guns to use when breaking into the home and robbing the persons 
therein. 
5. Mr. Van Huizen's role in the offense was committed in a violent, aggressive, or 
premeditated manner. 
a. These offenses were committed with guns and threats of violence. The 
guns belonged to Mr. Van Huizen and were provided knowing they would be used in the 
burglary and robberies. This planning occurred over a period of time and was not a spur 
of the moment decision. 
point into one of the most protected and sacred areas in our society, the home. 
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c. The violence committed in the home was facilitated by Mr. Van Huizen's 
planning and preparation. Mr. Van Huizen knew that the guns were intended to be used 
in a burglary and robbery for drugs. 
d. Mr. Van Huizen's presence in the home, by itself, was a threat to the 
victims and a danger to others who were in or could have come into the home. 
6. This is Mr. Van Huizen's first offense in juvenile court. 
7. Public safety is better served by adjudicating the minor in the district court. 
a. Mr. Van Huizen is 16 years old and juvenile court jurisdiction is limited 
until the age of 21; the district court's jurisdiction is not limited. 
b. The involvement of drugs, violence, firearms, and forcing entry into a 
home to commit robberies places these offenses among the most serious in our 
commwlity. 
c. The likelihood of harm to others was great given the facts of this case. 
People understandably react violently to such acts of aggression, particularly when they 
occur in the home. Acts of this nature are extremely volatile and can easily lead to even 
fatal harm to law enforcement and other members of the public. 
d. Public safety requires a strong response and longer correctional period 
than is available in the juvenile court. 
e. The defense provided evidence of a loving family and guod home. Thr: 
works against him in this case. Despite the benefits of that home he chose to engage in 
violent and irresponsible acts that put the safety of members of the public at grave risk. 
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8. The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it would be contrary to the 
best interest of the Defendant to bind him over to the jurisdiction of the district court. 
9. The defense has not shown, however, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is 
in the best interest of the public for this case to be adjudicated in juvenile court. The court finds 
that it is contrary to the best interests of the public to allow the case to remain in juvenile court. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER 
The Defendant should be and hereby is bound over to the district court for further 
proceedings on the Information. An arrest warrant has issued and bail has been set. 
DATED this~ day of January, 2014. 
BY THE COURT: 
,$j; 
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@ 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 

















Electronically Recorded on 
December 20, 2013 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE MICHELLE HEWARD 
Second District Juvenile Court Judge 
For the State: 
APPEARANCES 
Brody E. Flint 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
2380 Washington Blvd. :230 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: ( 801) 399-8377 
For the Defendant: Maryanne Ellis 
2564 Washington Blvd fflOl 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801)334-9537 
Rex Bray 
PO Box 321 
Sandy, UT 84091 
Telephone: (801) 553-1121 
Transcribed by: Natalie Lake, CCT 
152 E. Katresha St. 
Grantsville, ll'I' 84029 
Telephcne: 1435J 590-5575 
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WITNESS: TREVOR BARKER 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY: MR. FLINT 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY: MS. ELLIS 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY: MR. BRAY 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY: MR. FLINT 
RECROSS EXAMINATION BY: MS. ELLIS 
WITNESS: JOHN FROLLI 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY: MR. FLINT 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY: MR. BRAY 
WITNESS: CALI DUTSON 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY: MS. ELLIS 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY: MR. FLINT 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY: MS. ELLIS 
WITNESS: DAVID PULSON 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY: MS. ELLIS 
WITNESS: MARK VANHUIZEN 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY: MR. BRAY 
WITNESS: MINDY VANHUIZEN 
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I think in my meeting with CVH there at the detention 
center, I believe this has worked as an example of scaring kids 
straight. It is a first offense, but it's egregious. I -- it is 
a first -- 1st Degree Felonies, yet I still believe in him that he 
can in fact be treated and rehabilitated, that he can in fact be 
a productive member of society, your Honor, and we would once 
again ask the Court to please keep them in the juvenile court 
system rather than transferring this case to district court. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. The Court is going to take a 
break. I will rule today so that you will have my decision 
today. I'm going to shoot for 20 minutes, about a quarter to 3. 
We'll be back at that time. All right. Thank you. 
MS. ELLIS: Thank you. 
(Short recess taken) 
THE COURT: Do I have the record? 
COURT CLERK: Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you. We're back on the record in the 
CVH and JPD matters. I appreciate the your patience with the 
extra time. I figured it's better for me to take a few more 
m;n~tes now acd get chis t~ke~ care of as opposed Lv having you 
come bac~ nexc week sometime to make the decision. 
The defense has had the burden in the second portion of 
this hearing today proving by clear and convincing evidence that 
it is contrary to the best interest of the minor and the best 
··"'Jf1 f.J}•., 
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1 interest of the public to bind the defendants over to the 
2 jurisdiction of the district court. 
3 The Court wants to make sure that I'm making a record 
4 that is clear for both of the defendants individually and not 
5 placing them together. Counsel, I' 11 ask if there are any 
6 questions with regard to the findings as I go through here that 
7 you ask questions if I'm not clear with regard to each of your 
8 clients and to the State's interest so that I can make sure that 
9 that record is clear, and I'll attempt to do that. 
10 The Court has considered the five statutory factors that 
11 are set forth in 78A-6-702 (3) (c). The first of those factors by 
12 stipulation has been found to go in favor of each of the 
13 defendants. Neither one of them have prior records here in the 
14 juvenile court that are of any significance here. 
15 The second factor is whether the offenses were committed 
16 with one or more persons -- I'm sorry, these offenses were 
17 committed with one or more persons, so the Court considers 
18 whether each of the minor's involvement, whether each of them 
19 had a greater or lesser degree of culpability than their co-
20 defendants. 
2 J_ With r~garri t0 ~r. J?D, cne Court finds that his role 
in carrying out the offenses was one of planning and pulling 
p&cple togEtheE. The evid~nce before the Court shows that the 
24 culpability of Mr. JPD both before and during the actual offense 
25 shows that he had culpability. 
,·,7 ,., 
l. .. .")· ' l.' 
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1 He was involved in acquiring guns prior to the robbery, 
2 with the knowledge that they would be used in the robbery. He 
3 was in a place to use those weapons to gain entry. I'm sorry, 
4 he was in on the plan to use the weapons to gain entry into the 
5 home, and to take what he and his co-defendants wanted from the 
6 people within the home. 
@ 7 While the Court does not find that he pointed a gun at 
8 either of the victims -- I'm just not sure what happened there --
9 but I do find that that was done by two of the -- the two adults 
10 that were involved. Mr. JPD's involvement had a high degree of 
11 culpability in insuring that that would happen, that the people 
12 that he was with would pull guns and use them after breaking into 
13 the home. 
14 With regard to Mr. CVH, the Court finds that his 
15 involvement was less in terms of his physical involvement at the 
16 scene. I don't have evidence that he brandished a gun, and I 
17 have insufficient evidence to determine whether he had a 
18 switch -- the switchblade that had been referred to by others 
19 that have testified here today. 
20 His involvement was in planning and facilitating the 
?l 
These were his guns fcorn his horn~, and this was w~ll 
F:C.?.,~r1ec cut i:i terms of how the guns ,,ould be used. So in terms 
24 of the second factor, the Court finds that the involvement of 
25 each of the -- each of these defendants was significant in terms 
·, .. ~; ,: :; 
~~: :;J ~'-~ 
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1 of the offenses. 
2 Whether the role -- the third factor as the extent of 
3 the minor's role in was it committed in a violent, aggressive 
4 or premeditated manner. The premeditation in these offenses has 
5 been -- already been referred to by the Court. This was not a 
6 spur of the moment, a dumb or a childish decision, a quick 
7 reaction. Both defendants were involved in planning the 
8 robberies and the burglary. 
9 There were multiple steps that were carried out prior to 
10 actually going out to the home. This took place over a period of 
11 time, giving both of the defendants ample opportunity to retract 
12 themselves from the offenses, but they chose not to do so. These 
13 were violent and aggressive offenses with the use of guns and 
14 threats, going inside one of the most protected and sacred places 
15 in our society, the home. 
16 The violence that was employed, albeit by others in 
17 terms of pulling the guns, was made possible by Mr. CVH and 
18 facilitated by Mr. JPD. In addition to providing the guns by 
19 Mr. CVH and the planning or pulling together of the parties and 
20 facilitation by Mr. JPD, they both -- both of these defendants 
?1 
:hat t~~r were wlch who w~re using guns, and their physical 
presence -- I'm talking abouc the defendant's physical presence 
24 was a threat when the offense took place. The Court finds that 
25 the roles of both JPD and CVH to have been involved involved 
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1 violence, aggression and were premeditated. 
2 The number and nature -- the next factor is the number 
3 and nature of prior adjudications in the juvenile court. The 
@ 4 Court finds that those again go in favor of the defendants here. 
5 They do not have violent -- or they do not have records of any 
6 significance here in the juvenile court. 
7 The fifth factor is whether public safety is better 
8 served by adjudicating the minors in the juvenile court or in the 
9 district court. The Court believes that public safety would be 
10 better served in both of these cases by adjudicating them in the 
11 district court. 
12 They are older juveniles, 16 and 17-years of age. 
13 The extent of the juvenile court's involvement is limited until 
14 the age -- is limited to the age of 21. The district court's 
15 jurisdiction is not limited. While these were first offenses, 
16 the involvement of drugs, violence, particularly the use of 
17 firearms and forcibly entering into a home where people therein 
18 were robbed places the offense amongst the most serious in our :•. 
19 community. The likelihood of further injury and harm is great 
20 when given the facts of this case. Society deserves to be 
2] 
The Cou=t does find ths~ the dsfense has sno~~ that ic 
'J .-
L... .. ;, is contra=; to the best interest cf the minors to bi~d them ever 
24 to the jurisdiction of the district court. There are more 
rehabilitative services that are available in the juvenile system 
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1 than in the adult system. Both of the minors, both of the 
2 defendants appear to have loving families and homes that they 
3 have come from. They have had opportunities in the past to 
4 succeed, and they have skill sets that show that they have many 
5 capabilities. They chose not to use those. Either the support 
6 nor the positive skill sets that I think both of them have, they 
7 chose not to use those in this situation. 
8 So the Court finds that the defense has not met its 
9 burden of proving that it is contrary to the best interest of the 
10 minor and the best interest of the public to bind the defendants 
11 over to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Let me make sure 
12 that I've said that right. While the defense has met the burden 
13 of proving it is contrary to the minor's best interest, neither 
14 defense has met its burden of showing that it's in the best 
15 interest of the public in this inter in this instance, and the 
16 matter is bound over to the district court. 
17 On a personal note, this is not the way that I would 
18 want any young man to start his majority with serious offenses 
19 in the adult system. It's tough to be held accountable for 
20 your actions, but I also think that it's necessary -- that 
Y0~ still both have a lcl ~! years 
2~ fr~nt of yo~. and it !s the Court's hope that you use chis 
23 experience to do make better decisions and choices in the 
24 future as you move forward. 
25 That being said, I need arrest warrants here. Does the 
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State -- has the State prepared those? 
MR. FLINT: I have it prepared right here, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You do have them prepared? 
MR. FLINT: I'm just signing it. 
THE COURT: Okay. The Court does need to address the 
issue of bail. Does the State have a request with regard to 
bail? 
MR. FLINT: No, your Honor. I just think the standard 
bail is appropriate here. 
THE COURT: I don't know what the standard bail is for 
an adult. May I? 
MR. FLINT: Standard bail is I'm told for 1•t Degree 
Felonies, is 20,000 bondable. So 20,000 for each charge would be 
$60,000 bail would be standard. 
THE COURT: So 60,000? 
MR. FLINT: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Ms. Ellis, do you wish to be heard on the 
jssue of bail? 
MS. ELLIS: Your Honor, we would ask for a reduced bail 
for JPD. His family does have limited means. He's already been 
5n~~rceral9d for two months ac the tecen~io~ ~e~ter, a~d so we 
\-J~uld ask the C,::1;rt t.-::. c.-:.nsider lc-wei-5.H•~ his bail amount. 
addressed in the district court. He'll be assigned a new 
attorney over there. I don't know how long that will take for 
• : ;4, ··~ 
I - .It• 
._, ·~> t ,, < 
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1 him, so I would like to have his family have the ability to 
2 potentially bail him out, and I think $60,000 is very, very 
3 exclusive for them. They're not going to be able to do that. 
4 THE COURT: Do you have a request? 
5 MS. ELLIS: I would request 20,000. 
6 THE COURT: Thank you. Counsel? 
7 MR. BRAY: Your Honor, similar to Ms. Ellis's argument, 
8 CVH has been held for quite some time. The issue -- I wasn't 
9 sure we were going to address the bail here. I would ask the 
10 Court to consider a reduction of bail at this time as well. I do 
11 know that in the district court there's opportunities. I don't 
12 think it's a case of being released on own recognizance, but we 
13 do have other resources. We have pre-trial services or a 
14 probation officer that would monitor them until we get to that · ... 
.• . 
15 point. 
16 Your Honor, we'd ask the Court if the Court would @ 
17 consider reducing it to 20,000 just for the one count -- or 
18 (inaudible) 20,000 bail at this time, your Honor. I'm not sure 
19 (inaudible) we can get in even with the arrest warrant. They're 
20 going to be transferred to the county jail, is my understanding, 
21 1. t: h?. s r, ' t be e r, f i J -s d y P i. j_ r~ -..: •~, t h ~ 
22 di&trirt court, s~ as to addressing~ release to pre-trial 
Sbrvices or ba1i, we would ask the Courc ~u reduce -- or reduce 
24 the bail to 20,000 in this case, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Thank you. Does anyone from the county 
..·,, ;·:;:-•'f 
:~ "}i{~: 
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1 attorney's office know when this would be heard by a district 
2 court judge? 
3 MS. TOOMBS: Yes, your Honor. The two adult defendants 
4 are assigned to me. They are assigned to Judge Jones, and the 
5 next calendar date for them is January 8th • Judge Jones is 
6 holding a calendar on December 30 th at 2 o'clock, but of course 
7 our preference would be to have all five of the co-defendants 
8 together on January 8~. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. In terms of being able to get in 
10 front of the district court judge for purposes of bail, would 
11 there be a video arraignment or some opportunity to get in front 
12 of a district court judge? 
13 MS. TOOMBS: Your Honor, I would believe chat when they 
14 are booked into the Weber County Jail that they do appear on 
15 videos because the district court will first hear of them that 
16 way. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. That was my thought, but I wasn't 
18 sure what the procedure was. Thank you. All right. I'm setting 
19 $40,000 bail in this matter. We'll set it over to the district 
20 court. My guess is that you're going to be in front -- at least 
21 
!s there a~ythlnry else -- are there &ny questions 
24 that Counsel have with regard to clarification of my order? 
25 MR. FLINT: I don't have any, your Honor. 
. . .. "). 
1_,j'tb 
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MS. ELLIS: No, your Honor. 
MR. BRAY: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Flint, I'm instructing the 
county attorney's office to prepare the findings and the order in 
this matter, since you were the prevailing party. Good luck to 
all of you. Thank you. 
MR. BRAY: Thank you, your Honor. 
MS. ELLIS: Your Honor, with the arrest warrants, are 
they now going to be transferred to the Weber County Jail? 
THE COURT: They are. 
MS. ELLIS: Okay. 
(Hearing concluded) 
. ~- .. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
COOPER JOHN ANTHONY VAN 
HUIZEN. 
Defendant. 
OMNIBUS RULING AND 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
POST-SENTENCE MOTIONs\UG 2 9 2014 
Case No. 1319025 i-----------
Judge Ernie W. Jo es 
~ILED 
I AUG ~9 20;_] 
, SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
This matter is before the Court on Defendanfs several post-sentence 
motions. In order, Defendant has presented the Court with the following motions: 
.1) the "Motion to Correct Sentence Imposed Illegally as a Result of Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel"; 2) the "Motion to Reinstate Appeal of Right from Serious 
Youth Offender Bindover Order"; 3) the "Motion to Declare Misple~s or Nullify 
Pleas"; 4) the "Motion to Quash Bindover Order from Juvenile Court"; and 5) a 
"Motion for Stay of Sentence Pending Appeal" combined with an "Application for 
Ce1iificate of Probable Cause." Counsel for both the State and Defendant have 
• fully briefed these motions and the Court has carefully considered the arguments 
and law cited therein. In the interest of judicial efficiency, and as these motions 
touch on similar themes and legal questions, the Court will address these motions 
• in this single omnibus ruling and order . 
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BACKGROUND 
Defendant, following his participation in a violent home invasion, was 
charged with two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated 
burglary. Defendant, a 16-year-old minor, was then bound over from juvenile court 
to this Court to face the charges as an adult. The bind over process was conducted 
in accordance with the Juvenile Court Act, specifically its provisions relating to 
serious youth offenders See Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702. In March of this year, 
. Defendant entered guilty pleas to two reduced, second-degree felony robbery 
charges. On May 7, 2014, Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent 1- to 15-
year terms in the Utah State Prison. 
Defendant, by raising several alleged deficiencies, now seeks to challenge 
the process by which Defendant was bound over into district court from juvenile 
court, entered his plea of guilty, and a sentence was imposed. In deciding these 
motions, the Court will address each motion according to its chronological relation 
to Defendant's proceedings, rather than in the order that Defendant filed the 
motion with the Court. Following the Court's analysis and ruling, the Court will 
specify its respective orders. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Motion to Quash Bind Over Order from Juvenile Court 
First, the Court addresses Defendant's motion to quash the bind over order 
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• legal and structural errors that occurred during the process by which the juvenile 
court bound him over to this Court. The statutory mechanisms establishing this 
• 
• 
bind over process are outlined below . 
The Juvenile Court Act, specifically in its provisions relating to transferring 
serious youth offenders to district court, provides that juveniles may be bound over 
and held to answer to as adults in district court if the criminal information filed 
against those juveniles charges them with certain types of violent offenses. See 
• Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702. This process is not automatic and is subject to the 




been committed and that the juvenile defendant committed said violent offense . 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702(3). If the state met this burden, the juvenile court 
"shall order that the defendant be bound over [to the district court] ... unless the 
juvenile court judge finds that it would be contrary to the best interest of the minor 
and to the public .... " Id . 
The factors that a juvenile court judge may rely upon in making the 
determination to bind over the defendant are very specific, and the Juvenile Court 
• A.ct provid.e:-J that a juvenile defendant may appeal a bind over order.. Sec tJi:ah 
• 
• 
Code A.nn. 78A-·6-702(3)(c), ?8A-6-704(a). On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals 
then reviews the bind over order and the "underlying factual findings made by the 
juvenile judge" for "clear error)' in order to determine whether to affirm or reverse 
the bind over order. State ex rel. M.E.P., 114 P.3d 596, 598 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) . 
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This process illustrates that it is only the appellate court that is vested with 
the authority to consider and potentially quash juvenile bind over orders. 
Defendant has offered sundry arguments as to why this Court should quash the 
bind ov·er order, but such arguments to this Court are unavailing, as it possesses no 
jurisdiction to issue the particular relief sought. Only the appellate court may 
consider these arguments and order the bind over order quashed if that court 
determines that such action is appropriate. For lack of jurisdiction, this Court 
cannot grant such a motion. 
II. Motion to Reinstate Appeal of Right from Serious Youth Bind over 
Order 
The Court now turns to Defendant's motion to reinstate the timeframe to 
appeal the bind over order. Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the failure 
of then-serving counsel to timely file an appeal of the bind over order and the 
failure of same counsel to inform Defendant of the availability of such an appeal. 
Defendant cites the Utah Supreme Court case State v. Manning in support of the 
proposition fhat it is appropriate to reinstate appellate time when appeals of right 
, t·· 1 , i- - ' 1 t.. f"'. - f . ' ,. d r-; ,..., are oe.:,uJ.ea. 0y counsel. a.no. tnrougu no 1ault o the ue:i.:en- ant ,:-,ee ;:itate v. 
iVJ·.·~• ·• ' ,. "l')')I),) tc:;") q ,;'lC (l.]'· 0 ·t•200r-, •·1 ·1·- J.;_,,,,P: o-··~. , ' ' '· c · "': · 1, -"'·m~mg, ....• ;:. ..:>0. ~~-o, \,.J O 1,. l o. i. - J ) · le.- 0,ta:L, ai:::,.t. ~,ea l.D. lL., opp001ng 










bind over order reinstated. • 
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Manning provides that it is appropriate to reinstate a Defendant's direct 
appeal right if it can be determined that the defendant "been prevented in some 
meaningful way from proceeding with a first appeal of right." Id. at 635. One of 
the outlined circumstances of Manning leading to reinstatement of the direct appeal 
right is that the defendant can demonstrate that "the court or the defendant's 
attorney failed to properly advise defendant of the right to appeal." Id. While the 
State points out that the juvenile court bind over order clearly specified the 30-day 
• right to appeal that order, Defendant maintains that his counsel neither informed 





Normally a guilty plea, such as Defendant's here, would serve as a waiver of 
any alleged procedural defects with the bind over. See State v. Rhinehart, 167 P.3d 
1046, 1049 (Utah 2007). However, our Supreme Court has specified that this 
waiver does apply to alleged errors of a jurisdictional nature. Id. Here, had 
Defendant timely appealed the bind over order, he would have been challenging 
1. d . . f l . ·1 ' .c • • d' . i. D c- d t h" t11e ec1s1on o t 1.e Juveru e court w comer Juns 1ct10n over tne _ e1en ant .. o t. 1s 
e CourL This question,,. cor.obinf;d v,rith the fact thai: Defendant h.as offered evidence 
• 
• 
supporting the application of the )Wanning circumstances (namely that counsel 
failed to advise Defendant of his right to appeal and failed to provide him with the 
juvenile court order specifying the available relief) lez.d.s the Court to conclude that 
reinstating Defendant's time to appeal the bind over order is appropriate . 
,.. \ ~-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Omnibus Ruling and Order on Defendant's Post-Sentence Motions 
Civil No. 131902542 
Page 6 of 13 
The Court, however, must stress that granting Defendant's motion here does 
not affect Defendant's present incarceration, as the Court's decision cannot unwind 
all proceedings post-bind over order. When this Court heard the case, accepted the 
plea, and announced a sentence, it did so with the understanding that it held proper 
jurisdiction via bind over order. Barring an appellate court decision as to the 
validity of that bind over order and its effect on this Court's sentence, the Court 
lacks the authority to stay the sentence in conjunction with reinstating the time to 
appeal the bind over order. The appropriate procedural mechanism to stay a 
sentence pending appeal is found in Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. As mentioned in the outset of this ruling, Defendant has made a motion 
invoking that rule, and the Court will address the merits of that motion later in this 
ruling. 
Ill Motion to Declare Mispleas or Nullify Pleas 
Next the Court addresses Defendant's motion that this Court recognize 
Defendant's guilty pleas as mispleas or alternatively to nullify those guilty pleas. 
Defendant asserts that this Court retains the authority to declare a misplea here or 
to rn.JJ.Ii t~1 his pl.eas bec2.'l.rne the guilty pleas ·were not ln1ovving or voluntary. V1/hi le 
it 1s i:rue that a triai court may withd.rmv a plea of guilty upon a showing that the 
plea was not lmowingly or voluntarily made, such motions must be made prior to 
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challenge to a guilty plea "not made within the [specified] time period" can only be 
pursued via request for post-conviction relief. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)( c ). 
Here, the Court has announced its sentence regarding the Defendant's 
conviction. Accordingly, the Court possesses neither the authority to hear such a 
motion nor the ability to grant the requested remedy. Defendant's arguments 
regarding knowledge, volition, and their relation to his guilty pleas may only be 
offered in a separate, civil petition for post-conviction relief. The Court therefore 
cannot grant this motion. 
IV. Motion to Correct Sentence Imposed Illegally as a Result of Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel 
Defendant also moves this Court, pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 22( e ), to correct Defendant's sentence on the basis that the sentence was 
illegal. In support of this motion, Defendant offers that the sentence was illegal 
due to trial counsel's ineffective assistance at the sentencing hearing. Specifically, 
Defendant argues that the assistance was ineffective because trial counsel failed at 
the sentencing hearing to distinguish Defendanf s culpabiWy from that of his co-
defondant:,:•1 3.n.d failed to provide the Comi: (for purpo::;es of presentcnce repo;:ti:n.g) 
Defendant's strenuous argument, ineffective assistance of counsel does not serve 
as grounds for declaring a sentence illegal. 
:· :{~~~ } 
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Regarding illegal sentences, the Utah Supreme Court has adopted the 
definition promulgated by the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. State v. Yazzie, 203 
P.3d 984, 988 (Utah 2009). Under that definition, a sentence is illegal if it "is 
ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is 
internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is 
uncertain as to the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence which the judgment 
of conviction did not authorize." United States v. Dougherty, 106 F.3d 1514, 1515 
(10th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the State points out, a 
sentence is also illegal if the imposing court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. State 
v. Thorkelson, 84 P.3d 854, 857 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). 
As the Court cannot consider Defendant's arguments of ineffective 
assistance of counsel as a proper basis for declaring the sentence here illegal, it 
must determine whether the any of the aforementioned, recognized grounds apply. 
The Court determines that they do not. Defendant pled guilty to two counts of 
robbery. Robbery is classified under Utah Code Annotated §76-6-301 as a second-
degree felony. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203 , the appropriate 
r ~- :._ ,..:, .:. ·- -~i : . .. ,.. ..! .• r.::., ··· - -- ...,,,. ,,.. r -J-: -v --- ... ~ r -, -~- ,~- .'- -; Q -·-h ,.... · · _:.,. --,. . · .,.., .. . ~."" ,.. __ ... .... , ·~l-- ·- 1 t;.. 
,1.11111ue~~u1.uw.t.i;:; u~u IJ. u1 JL1]JJ.1somnen, not 1es.., L a1.1 one ) eai. x1.01- 111.c,1 t, : .. ian __ _) 
years." Utah Code Ann. §76--3-203(2). Defendant's sentence here was not 
ambiguous with respect to time or manner. It was not intem8lly contradictory. It 
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e substance of the sentence. It was precisely the sort of sentence authorized by the 








jurisdiction subsequent to the issuance of the bind over order from juvenile court . 
None of the established grounds that would render a sentence illegal and require 
correction under Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure exist here . 
Accordingly, the Court can find no basis to properly grant Defendant's motion. 
V. Motion to Stay Sentence Pending Appeal and Issue a Certificate of 
Probable Cause 
Finally, the Court addresses Defendant's petition for a certificate of probable 
cause motion to his Motion to stay his sentence pending appeal. In order to release 
a currently incarcerated defendant during the pendency of his appeal, Rule 27 of 
the Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure requires that that this Court first issue a 
certificate of probable cause and determine by clear and convincing evidence that 
the defendant is not likely to flee and does not pose a danger to the community. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 27(b)(l). In order to properly issue a certificate of probable 
cause, the Court must find that the Defendant's appeal is not taken for the purpose 
Out of the myriad arguments Defendant has made, the Court has recognized 
• only one as cognizant: that the Defendant may appeal the juvenile Court bind over 
order due to the failure of trial counsel to apprise him of his right to appeal the 
• 
'· : __ ; 
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order. However, this Court is not convinced by Defendant' s arguments that it is 
reasonably likely that the Court of Appeals will quash the bind over order. 
Furthermore, on the basis of the clearly delineated jurisprudence that informs the 
Court's analysis of Defendant's other motions, the Court is not convinced that 
Defendant has raised any substantial issues of law and fact that make it reasonably 
likely that the Court of Appeals will overturn the Court's other determinations. 
Specifically as to the bind over order, Defendant's argument challenges the 
juvenile court judge's qualifications to hear his case and only collaterally attacks 
the juvenile court's consideration of the five factors that must be analyzed when 
deciding to bind over a defendant to district court. As stated previously, the 
statutory provisions of Utah Code Annotated 78A-6-702(3)(c) require that juvenile 
court judges only consider five specific factors when making bind over 
determinations. Nothing in Defendant' s arguments suggests that the juvenile court 
deviated from those factors and none ofDefendanf s proffered alternative 
conclusions to each of those factors is legally or factuall.y significant enough to call 
the courf s decision into question. 
regarding the juveniie cou1t judge (specifically her personal and profossionoJ 
background) raise an issue of fact or law significant enough to make reversal of th e 
bind over reasonably certain. As the Court can find no 2.dequ.atl"; ground on thi::: 
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• that would warrant the issuance of a certificate of probable cause, the Court will 










Even if the Court were to find a basis to issue the certificate of probable 
cause, the circumstances forming the basis of Defendant's conviction demonstrate 
that it is not in the community's best interest to release him from incarceration . 
The Defendant is serving his current sentence because he pled guilty to robbery-a 
robbery accomplished through home invasion and through Defendant's provision 
of firearms. These are actions and the sort of behavior that can only be 
characterized as absolutely contrary to the societal interests of peace and safety. 
Defendant's age does not mitigate the gravity of these actions. Indeed, the 
severity of his behavior warranted charging him in district court as an adult. It 
would be antithetical to the interests-even safety--of the community to suspend 
the operation of his sentence. Absent grounds to issue a certificate of probable 
cause, and in light of the circumstances of the offense, the Court is not convinced 
that it is appropriate to release defendant from incarceration. 
ORDER~ 
Appeal of IZight from Serious Youth Bindover Ordtr is i-3,hJU~TED. All other 
motions captioned and discussed herein are hereby DE.N1ED. In accordance with 
granting Defendant's Motion to Reinstate Appea] of Right from. Serious Y01-1.tb_ 
Bindover Order, the 30--day period to appeal the bind over order is reinstated. 
- .• i. : /,;-• 
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Pursuant to Rule 4(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, any such appeal of 
that bind over order must be filed within 30 days of the entry of this Order. 
Dated this :i ~ day of A v<-oi, v\:>T2014. 
-- ' \ 
1~<1,,--r----
Judge Ernie W. Jones \ 
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Text Messages Recovered From 
Joshua Dutson's Phone 










(from Defendant) (to Defendant) 
Rob some niggas 
Hahahahah 
no what I'm 
saying? 
Want in you'll 
get a cut of it? 
Hahahaha 
Then we take 
that. 
But yeah I'll do 
that for sure I 
just gotta get my 
gun back from 
anddrew. 
That's hella chill 




' JK I'm mot i 
------·---- ------------ I 
----~---- ._j 
" 
Not what? Ha - -- - ------! ~:-f' o'' ; 
·n i: · i , er ~h , , ' 
, l. 11.US.l.,7 •.. C 
: shit outa me 
! 
I 1008 I 
~- -~-~------ __]_ _________ ~ 
Incoming 
(from Skinner) 
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Time Defendant & Dutson Skinner & Dutson 
Incoming Outgoing 
(from Defendant) (to Defendant) 
Incon1ing Outgo:ing 
I (from Skinner) ( to Skinner) 
Im high 
hahaHaha 
you can be apart 
of it but you 
gotta keep it on 
the down low .. 
an trust no nigga 
He want to help 
rob nigga 
About what? 
10:09 Robbing or driving the 
mustang? 
I know 
10:10 I' rn not dumb 
hahaaha! I I 
10:12 Haha 
Tomorrow we 
10:14 grab them straps 
and hit up 
' ! 
' i 1 niggas 
I 
I : 














_______ _J_ ________ ~ 
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Time Defendant & Dutson Skinner & Dutson 
Incoming Outgoing Incoming Outgoing 
(from Defendant) (to Defendant) (from Skinner) (to Skinner) 
Like 11 or when 
ever Dexter 
[Skinner] wants 
us to .. But I have 
10:16 to bring the car home at 2:15 
cause I'm not 
supposed to chill 
with anyone 
tomorrow 
Okay that's chill. 
An Kyra says 
7:45 
She wants to got 
10:18 to Dexters that 
early 
10:19 Yeah Haha so we 
can get the lick 
10:20 We going 
through nigga ha 
Say wah? 
10:21 We gonna go 
through? 
tho .. Mv dad's 
.I 
10:22 not gunna leave I 
tell almost 8 I 
. ·---------1 -~•-•·--· 




.____._______.__._______.[ I I 
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Time Defendant & Dutson Skinner & Dutson 
Incoming Outgoing Incoming Outgoing 
(from Defendant) (to Defendant) (from Skinner) (to Skinner) 
That's what's up 
10:23 ma nigga much lovefamhum 
tomorrow 
Pasho 
10:25 much love 
family 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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@ 
Time Dutson & Defendant 
Incoming Outgoing 
(from Defendant) (to Defendant) 
1:44 Wanna hit up a lick today 
No I can't 
1:45 anymore my dad 
is coming home 
1:46 Later? Not now 
How later? 
1:47 Idk like 7-8 
1:48 Maybe .. I'll hit u 
up later 
Cool 
2:07 The little white boys we hit up 
Hahah 
2:08 He hitting them 
again 
Ur 
Jk Haha Imhigh 
@ 
@ 
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